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BERKEMER REVISITED:
UNCOVERING THE MIDDLE GROUND BETWEEN
MIRANDA AND THE NEW TERRY
Michael J. Roth*
Over the past twenty-five years, appellate courts have significantly
expanded the scope of police authority to stop and frisk potential suspects
without probable cause, a power originally granted to law enforcement by
the Supreme Court in Terry v. Ohio. This development has led Terry's once
limited licensing of police searches to run into conflict with a defendant's
right against compulsory self-incrimination while in police custody, as
articulated by Miranda v. Arizona. This Note explores the contours of this
unforeseen collision between two core constitutional doctrines and the
solutions generated by appellate courts to resolve the conflict. Courts
today are generally divided as to whether, Miranda should apply during a
valid, but intrusive Terry stop. This Note argues that a distinct overlap now
exists between Miranda and Terry; one that should compel courts to invoke
Miranda where police detain and question a suspect in a manner analogous
to custodial interrogation. However, this Note also stresses that courts
should be vigilant in enforcing the public safety exception to Miranda,
particularly in light of Terry's inherent unpredictability and
extemporaneous nature.
INTRODUCTION
On July 23, 2004, a man carrying a gun entered the Liberty Savings Bank
in St. Cloud, Minnesota.' He pointed the gun at the teller and demanded
that she place all the money from the drawer beneath her on the counter.
The man took the money and fled. 2 A few moments later, the bank
contacted the police and provided them with a description of the robber.3
During their surveillance of the area, about a half-mile away from where
the robbery took place, a police officer noticed a man sharing similar
attributes to the description provided by the police report.4 The officer did
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not have an exact match, but he held a reasonable suspicion based on the
suspect's physical characteristics, principally his race, height, and weight.
The police officer, with the assistance of a fellow officer, surrounded the
man, patted him down for weapons, and informed him that he was being
detained for further investigation.5  During the encounter, the police
handcuffed the suspect and inquired whether he possessed any weapons.
They also discovered a large bundle of cash in the suspect's pocket. 6
While questioned by police, the suspect made inconsistent statements
about the money's origin and the circumstances leading up to his
procurement of the money. 7 Based on the suspect's conflicting responses,
the police placed him in their patrol car where, only then, did they notify
him of his right to remain silent and the right to an attorney. The officers
drove the suspect to the bank for identification. 8 There, the employees
confirmed that the suspect was indeed the perpetrator. The police then
formally placed the suspect under arrest.9
This case illustrates an important legal conflict that currently exists
among a majority of federal appellate courts: at what point should police
officers be required to inform a suspect of his rights during their detention?
More specifically, if a suspect is detained in a manner similar to that of an
arrest, such as being handcuffed and surrounded by police, is there a
legitimate concern that statements made by the suspect during this detention
might be the product of police coercion? If so, should courts strive to deter
such results?
Twenty-five years ago, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled in Berkemer v.
McCarty10 that routine traffic stops authorized by Terry v. Ohio1I do not, as
a general rule, require law enforcement officials to read suspects their rights
as articulated in Miranda v. Arizona 12 before further questioning. 13 Terry
and its progeny provide police with a narrowly tailored exception to the
traditional probable cause standard for searches permitted under the Fourth






10. 468 U.S. 420 (1984).
11. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
12. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
13. Berkemer, 468 U.S. at 438-39 ("In short, the atmosphere surrounding an ordinary
traffic stop is substantially less 'police dominated' than that surrounding the kinds of
interrogation at issue in Miranda itself, and in the subsequent cases in which we have
applied Miranda." (citing Orozco v. Texas, 394 U.S. 324, 325 (1969); Mathis v. United
States, 391 U.S. 1, 2-3 (1968); Miranda, 384 U.S. at 445, 491-98)).
14. A frisk in connection with Terry v. Ohio does not constitute a traditional search
within the Fourth Amendment rubric. 392 U.S. at 29. Contrary to a comprehensive search
sustained by probable cause, the U.S. Supreme Court in Terry envisioned a frisk to involve
only a brief pat down of a suspect to secure potential weapons that might threaten public
safety, not a search to secure evidence with an eye toward criminal prosecution. See id.
Despite the formal distinction between a frisk and search, this Note will often refer to a frisk
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exception provides that police may conduct a brief and limited stop and
frisk of a suspect without probable cause when they have a reasonable
suspicion that the individual is on the verge of (or in the midst of)
committing a crime that involves some immediate danger. 15 Meanwhile,
Miranda provides defendants with some relief from potentially coercive
police interrogations by mandating that, before the interrogation, officers
read a defendant his legal rights when in custodial settings that involve
inherently coercive pressures (Miranda rights or Miranda warnings).' 6
Looking back, Berkemer marked only the initial confrontation in what
now has emerged as a palpable tension between two core principles of the
Warren Court jurisprudence: heightened vigilance toward protecting a
criminal suspect's Fifth Amendment privilege against compulsory self-
incrimination, and a police officer's authority to conduct a limited search
based on a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, a firm exception to the
Fourth Amendment probable cause requirement.1 7 Back in 1984, the Court
in Berkemer understood these two doctrines as operating largely in a
mutually exclusive context.1 8 After all, the type of search authorized by the
Court in Terry was intended to be brief and limited, unlike the highly
intrusive character of police interrogations associated with Miranda.19 In
addition, the Court's narrow holding in Berkemer applied only to routine
vehicle stops, not the broad spectrum of Terry encounters for which lower
courts would ultimately deem it authoritative. 20 Since Berkemer, the vast
expansion of police authority permitted by lower courts under Terry, such
as the use of handcuffs, drawn weapons, and the relocation of suspects to
police cruisers, has reinvigorated the debate about whether a tangible
overlap between Miranda warnings and Terry stops now exists, leaving
appellate courts with an issue far different in scope than that addressed by
the Supreme Court in Berkemer.21
under Terry as a type of search or "Terry search." Indeed, the Court has done so on several
occasions. See, e.g., Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 374 (1993); Michigan v. Long,
463 U.S. 1032, 1050 (1983). Even Terry itself referred to the frisk as a search. See generally
Terry, 392 U.S. 1.
15. See infra Part I.B. 1-2.
16. See infra Part I.A. 1-2.
17. This current struggle has been waged at the appellate level and among state courts.
The U.S. Supreme Court has remained silent on the issue since Berkemer v. McCarty, 468
U.S. 420 (1984). See infra notes 261-63 and accompanying text.
18. See, e.g., United States v. Manbeck, 744 F.2d 360, 379 n.30 (4th Cir. 1984)
(observing that the "Supreme Court has implied that custodial interrogations [for Miranda]
and Terry stops are mutually exclusive").
19. See infra Part I.A. 1, B. 1.
20. See Berkemer, 468 U.S. at 435-42; see also infra Part II.A.
21. See infra notes 223-25 and accompanying text; see also E. Martin Estrada,
Criminalizing Silence: Hiibel and the Continuing Expansion of the Terry Doctrine, 49 ST.
Louis U. L.J. 279, 281-89 (2005) (tracing the evolution of Terry from its original, limited
scope to its currently broad implementation); Mark A. Godsey, When Terry Met Miranda:
Two Constitutional Doctrines Collide, 63 FORDHAM L. REv. 715, 728 (1994). Mark
Godsey's article was the first to introduce and fully elaborate on the growing schism among
appellate courts on this issue.
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To better understand and ultimately resolve the current conflict between
Miranda and Terry, one must be able to distinguish between the particular
rules codified by each doctrine and the respective interests they each serve.
Aside from producing basic guidelines for courts to follow, each doctrine is
itself the product of balancing competing societal interests, in particular
society's fundamental "interest in prompt and efficient law enforcement,
and its interest in preventing the rights of its individual members from
being abridged by unconstitutional methods of law enforcement. '22 As this
Note demonstrates, the current schism among courts is as much a discord
over the appropriate balance between these institutional factors as it is a
disagreement over the basic application of Miranda's and Terry's technical
holdings. 23
It is also worth mentioning up front that this Note accepts as a given the
expansion of police authority permitted by courts under Terry over the past
forty years. Almost immediately following its inception, courts began
applying the Terry doctrine beyond the limited constraints of its original
scope and purpose. 24 In fact, one would be hard-pressed to find a court
today that applies Terry according to that opinion's initial framework.
It follows that this Note rejects the argument that scaling back Terry to its
original character would best resolve the matter.25 To be sure, reining
Terry back to its original context would in theory resolve the conflict,
dissipating any vestige of potential tension between Miranda and Terry.26
However, doing so is not only improbable, but also impractical given the
degree of reliance exercised by courts and law enforcement officials on
Terry's progeny.27  Maintaining theories, as Justice Oliver Wendell
Holmes, Jr., wrote, is not the U.S. Constitution's intention. 28 It is rather "to
preserve practical and substantial rights. ' 29 This Note seeks to explicate the
growth of Terry for the sole purpose of reconciling its expansion with
contemporary concerns and interests promoted by Miranda. Only then can
courts formulate a "practical and substantial" legal solution. 30
Part I of this Note details the background leading up to the current
conflict. It emphasizes the historical context that produced both Miranda
and Terry, and the evolution of each doctrine in subsequent years. Both
Miranda and Terry were products of the Warren Court, an era characterized
22. Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315, 315 (1959).
23. See infra notes 267-70 and accompanying text.
24. See infra notes 173-87 and accompanying text.
25. See Godsey, supra note 21, at 746-47.
26. See id.; see also supra note 21 and accompanying text.
27. See infra notes 223-25 and accompanying text. Mark Godsey's 1994 article
advocated scaling back Terry during a period when lower courts were still in the process of
defining Terry's new and expansive scope. However, fifteen years later, the breadth of
police authority under Terry, to the extent addressed in this Note, can no longer be
considered an issue of material debate among appellate jurisdictions. Today, the matter is
well settled.





by broad, far-reaching opinions that made a lasting impact on both federal
and state law. 31 While Terry expanded law enforcement authority, granting
it power to briefly detain a suspect without probable cause, Miranda placed
limitations on police conduct by requiring officers to abide by certain
procedural guidelines if their detention generated potentially coercive
pressures. Following Chief Justice Earl Warren's retirement in 1969, a
more conservative Court labored to restrict Miranda's hold on law
enforcement while expanding the scope of the Terry exception.32
Part I also analyzes the Court's ruling in Berkemer, its seminal
perspective on the relationship between Miranda and Terry. Berkemer's
holding was limited to the denial of a Miranda claim during a routine,
motor vehicle stop. However, the opinion also included important dicta
suggesting that Miranda warnings would not apply to most Terry
encounters, given what it considered to be Terry's limited character. Since
then, appellate courts have seized upon Berkemer's language to justify
denial of Miranda rights during far more intrusive stop and frisk
scenarios. 33
Part I concludes with a discussion of recent developments that have
sustained the current conflict. Over the past twenty-five years, appellate
courts have significantly expanded police authority under Terry, assenting
to the use of handcuffs, drawn weapons, and transportation of suspects
under the aegis of an officer's stop and frisk powers. 34 In addition, new
societal concerns related to the threat of terrorism indicate that courts are
now more likely to side with police and to increase law enforcement
authority to search and forcefully detain potential suspects.35 These recent
developments have injected Terry stops with more coercive police
techniques, which raise new Miranda concerns not foreseen by the Terry or
even Berkemer Courts. Indeed, the current conflict is rooted not only in
Terry's expansion, but also in lower courts' unwillingness to acknowledge
that growth as they continue to apply Berkemer's dicta to situations well
beyond its intended scope.
Part II introduces the two basic approaches adopted by appellate courts to
resolve the current problem. The U.S. Courts of Appeals for the First,
Fourth, and Sixth Circuits have held that the inherent reasonableness of a
stop and frisk permitted under the Terry doctrine precludes the necessity of
Miranda considerations during particularly intrusive stops (inherent
reasonableness approach). 36 The U.S. Courts of Appeals for the Second,
Seventh, and Tenth Circuits have ruled that highly intrusive Terry stops
31. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr. & Daniel J. Meltzer, New Law, Non-retroactivity, and
Constitutional Remedies, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1731, 1744 (1991) ("At least in the area of
criminal procedure, the Warren Court acted on a view of the judicial role, in both its
substantive and its remedial aspects, that permitted far-reaching constitutional revision.").
32. See infra Part I.A.2, B.2.
33. See infra Part 1I.B.
34. See infra notes 223-25 and accompanying text.
35. See infra notes 230-54 and accompanying text.
36. See infra Part I.B.
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may require Miranda warnings before further interrogation can proceed
(intrusive level approach). 37 In addition, the U.S. Courts of Appeals for the
Eighth and Ninth Circuits have each rendered inconsistent rulings on the
matter.3
8
Finally, Part III recommends a balanced approach that seeks enforcement
of Miranda when such custodial interrogations do arise, but also takes
seriously potential public safety threats that warrant a delay of Miranda's
application, a condition that might arise frequently during Terry encounters
given their focus on ad hoc detentions in public venues. This Note asserts
that there exists a patent overlap between the two doctrines during highly
intrusive Terry stops. Rather than constructing an approach that ignores
this reality or advocates unrealistic changes in the law as a matter of
convenience, courts should seek common ground between Miranda and
Terry, a compromise that can be attained through awareness and
understanding of the interests each doctrine respectively serves.
To accomplish that feat, this Note proposes a two-part inquiry that
determines first whether a defendant is subject to custodial interrogation
during a Terry stop according to the basic Miranda standard. If custodial
interrogation is established, the additional question then becomes whether
the state can present an overriding public safety concern that might justify
postponement of Miranda warnings. Enforcing this exception preserves the
Supreme Court's paramount concern in Terry for law enforcement to be
able to act swiftly in situations involving exigent circumstances. 39 It is also
perfectly consistent with Miranda itself, as the Court determined in New
York v. Quarles,40 where public safety concerns warranted a delay of
Miranda warnings so that the police could gather vital information to avoid
potential violence.4' If the state cannot present such a justification, then
Miranda should apply. This Note's test, however, does not alter the
current, expanded version of Terry altogether. 42 The approach does not
argue for the exclusion of physical evidence under the Fourth Amendment
as a way to counteract Terry's broad expansion at the appellate level. It
merely subjects that legitimate police authority under Terry to Fifth
Amendment exclusionary principles when Miranda enters the equation.
In fact, enforcing Miranda during various Terry encounters by no means
undermines law enforcement's ability to carry out its proper duties as
peacekeepers. For one, Miranda's application during ad hoc police
encounters does not jeopardize the admissibility of any physical evidence
37. See infra Part I.C.
38. See infra Part I.B-C.
39. See infra notes 143-56 and accompanying text.
40. 467 U.S. 649 (1984).
41. Id. at 651. For the reader's clarification, this Note uses variations of the terms
"public safety," "immediate danger," and "immediate exigency" interchangeably. They all
refer to immediate potential violence directed at either law enforcement or innocent
bystanders.
42. An officer may justify a Terry stop today based on any suspicion of criminal
activity. See infra notes 175-83 and accompanying text.
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during trial, even where Miranda itself has been violated.43 The Supreme
Court has established that the Fifth Amendment right against compulsory
self-incrimination does not extend to physical evidence, which, in this
context, applies to any evidence obtained during a valid Terry frisk or as a
product of police questioning. 44 Only the defendant's statements may be
excluded as a product of a Miranda violation. Meanwhile, the public safety
exception assures that when police need a defendant's cooperation at a
moment of immediate peril, Miranda will be delayed until that danger is
averted. In the end, this Note's proposal seeks to preserve and enforce a
defendant's constitutionally guaranteed right against compulsory self-
incrimination while not placing an insurmountable burden on the state to
protect the public from immediate harm.
Ultimately, resolving the current conflict between Miranda and Terry
provides much needed clarity to the law of criminal investigative procedure.
While a Miranda challenge can only exist in the context of attempting to
exclude evidence at trial, there is also great value in preserving liberty at the
moment when the individual's constitutional right is violated.45 In the post-
9/11 era, where the apparent need to remain vigilant over suspicious activity
has created more uncertainty than clarity, the judiciary must be at the
forefront of that movement to more effectively articulate the proper balance
between liberty and security.46 Law enforcement's ability to act swiftly in
cases involving reasonable suspicion remains a vital tool, in particular
against potential threats that far exceed those imaginable forty years ago.
However, the law must operate within its permitted barriers according to
the Constitution. In this context, the current impasse created by Miranda
and Terry should be resolved.
I. EARL WARREN'S Two OPINIONS: THE SEEDS OF CONFLICT AND THE
MODERN EXPANSION OF TERRY V. OHIO
Part I discusses the birth and development of both Miranda and Terry
over the past forty years, along with recent trends that have fostered the
collision between the two doctrines. Part I.A focuses exclusively on
43. See United States v. Patane, 542 U.S. 630, 634 (2004) (holding that physical fruits of
a Miranda violation need not be excluded).
44. See, e.g., Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 764 (1966) ("The distinction which
has emerged ... is that the privilege [against compulsory self-incrimination] is a bar against
compelling 'communications' or 'testimony,' but that compulsion which makes a suspect or
accused the source of 'real or physical evidence' does not violate it.").
45. This is what Justice Antonin Scalia characterized as the "distinction between, on the
one hand, trial rights that derive from the violation of constitutional guarantees
[(exclusionary principles)] and, on the other hand, the nature of those constitutional
guarantees themselves." Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 183 (1990).
46. September 11 th has undoubtedly altered the manner in which judges view the world
and, hence, the law. See, e.g., Panel Discussion, Trying Cases Related to Allegations of
Terrorism: Judges' Roundtable, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 1, 2 (2008) (comments of Judge
Gerald Ellis Rosen) ("[I]t occur[s] to me how much the world is changing-not just for
[citizens living in] New York in the aftermath of 9/11, but for those of us in the judicial
system and in the courts. We all have to adapt and change.").
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Miranda's inception and growth while Part I.B traces the evolution of
Terry. Part I.C examines the Supreme Court's first and only impression of
the potential overlap between the two in Berkemer, a decision that has
gradually become obsolete and misleading for courts who today continue to
struggle with the collision between Miranda and Terry. Finally, Part I.D.
discusses two post-Berkemer developments that have rendered that opinion
outdated: the sanction of more intrusive police tactics under Terry by lower
courts and the new political reality facing the judicial system in the post-
9/11 era.
A. A History of Miranda
No person... shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness
against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law .... 47
The Miranda decision sought to protect defendants from inherently
coercive pressures during police interrogation that might compel them
essentially to be witnesses against themselves. Part I.A. 1 details the
impetus for creating Miranda's framework and its legal impact on police
interrogations. Part I.B.2 discusses the post-Warren Court's treatment of
Miranda, a period that ultimately limited Miranda's scope primarily to the
circumstances and conditions specified by Miranda itself.
1. The Decision
The Warren Court decided Miranda in 1966 at the peak of its so-called
criminal procedure revolution,48 in which constitutional protections
afforded to criminal suspects expanded while traditional police practices
became subject to increased judicial scrutiny.49 As the Warren Court
carried out this movement, its detractors often accused the Court of basing
its decisions on the Justices' own personal philosophies rather than on the
47. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
48. See LUCAS A. POWE, JR., THE WARREN COURT AND AMERICAN POLITICS 407 (2000)
("Miranda was the highpoint of the Warren Court's criminal procedure revolution .... ");
see also Stephen Schulhofer, Miranda v. Arizona: A Modest but Important Legacy, in
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE STORIES 155, 157-63 (Carol S. Steiker ed., 2006); David A. Strauss,
The Common Law Genius of the Warren Court, 49 WM. & MARY L. REv. 845, 868 (2007);
Mark Tushnet, Observations on the New Revolution in Constitutional Criminal Procedure,
94 GEO L.J. 1627, 1627-29 (2006).
49. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357-59 (1967) (declaring that wiretapping
of telephone booths by investigators without a warrant violated the Fourth Amendment);
Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 490-91 (1964) (ruling that the Sixth Amendment
provides a criminal defendant the right to counsel during a police interrogation); Brady v.
Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963) (finding a due process violation where the prosecution
withheld certain evidence from the defendant during trial); Douglas v. California, 372 U.S.
353, 355 (1963) (guaranteeing indigent defendants the right to counsel during their first
appeal of a criminal trial); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 345 (1963) (requiring states
to provide counsel to defendants who could not afford one in criminal trials according to the
Sixth Amendment); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 653-55 (1961) (incorporating the
exclusionary rule to state criminal procedure law through the Fourteenth Amendment).
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Constitution itself.50 In the end, few decisions generated more discussion
and controversy than Miranda.5 1
The Court's ruling in Miranda was in many respects a conservative
reaction to its more open-ended decision rendered two years earlier in
Escobedo v. Illinois,52 in which the Court increased judicial oversight over
confessions and admissions made by defendants during the course of police
interrogations. 53 Justice Arthur Goldberg's brief, but expansive, majority
opinion in Escobedo explained that the Sixth Amendment's right to counsel
(not the Fifth Amendment's protection against compulsory self-
incrimination, which the Court would later use to support Miranda) granted
a criminal defendant the right to an attorney while being interrogated once
he became the focus of the police investigation. 54 The Court determined
that an attorney's presence was necessary based on the recurring practice
among police to use coercive means to produce self-incriminating
confessions from criminal suspects. 55 The Court in Escobedo reiterated its
intent to go beyond the pillars of a courtroom setting and into the more
discrete confines of a police station when considering criminal defendant
protections. 56
Most significant, the opinion possessed an especially hostile attitude
toward police interrogation practices altogether, in particular their
50. See, e.g., Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems,
47 IND. L.J. 1, 6 (1971) (challenging the Warren Court's legitimacy on several constitutional
issues based on his view that "no argument that is both coherent and respectable can be made
supporting a Supreme Court that 'chooses fundamental values' because a Court that makes
rather than implements value choices cannot be squared with the presuppositions of a
democratic society"); Edwin Meese III, Promoting Truth in the Courtroom, 40 VAND. L.
REv. 271, 272-73 (1987) (arguing that some members of the Court "were then willing to
compromise the search for truth in favor of extrinsic policy objectives"). Criticism of the
Warren Court came from all different directions, including retired Supreme Court Justices,
politicians, academics, and various political and social organizations. See generally
CLIFFORD M. LYTLE, THE WARREN COURT AND ITS CRITICS (1968). Even renowned author
Truman Capote, who had recently published his best-selling novel, In Cold Blood, testified
before a congressional subcommittee that "had the Miranda ruling been in effect when the
murderers of the Clutter family were captured, the two killers, who were later hanged, would
have gone 'scot free."' LIVA BAKER, MIRANDA: CRIME, LAW AND POLITICs 201 (1983).
51. See Schulhofer, supra note 48, at 163-67 ("Miranda drew bitter opposition, literally
from day one."). In response to popular sentiment against Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436
(1966), Congress enacted the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, by
which 18 U.S.C. § 3501 purportedly overturned Miranda. See Pub. L. No. 90-351, § 701(a),
82 Stat. 210 (1968), invalidated by Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428 (2000).
However, the Supreme Court eventually ruled 18 U.S.C. § 3501 unconstitutional. See
Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 431-32; see also infra notes 115-16 and accompanying text.
52. 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
53. See id. at 490-91.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 485-90.
56. Id. at 484-85 (stating that "a Constitution which guarantees a defendant the aid of
counsel at . . . trial could surely vouchsafe no less to an indicted defendant under
interrogation by the police in a completely extrajudicial proceeding" (quoting Massiah v.
United States, 377 U.S. 201, 204 (1964)) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
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procurement of confessions through unseemly tactics. 57 The dissenting
bloc in Escobedo argued vigorously against the Court's Sixth Amendment
interpretation and predicted that its enforcement would ultimately render
police interrogations useless in the fact-seeking process. 58
Two years later, in Miranda, the Court reaffirmed that preindictment
police interrogations would be subject to robust constitutional supervision.
However, the Miranda opinion curtailed Escobedo's implication that
confessions during police interrogation would never be admissible. 59 Chief
Justice Warren's opinion in Miranda declared that the Fifth Amendment
guarantee against compulsory self-incrimination prohibited police officers
from questioning a suspect in custody unless the police gained a suspect's
consent after notifying him of his legal rights.60 In doing so, the opinion
abandoned Escobedo's Sixth Amendment imposition of an attorney's
presence during the interrogation, a change that provided police with at
least some opportunity to question a suspect if he consented.6'
Those essential rights articulated by the Court in Miranda, now enshrined
in our culture, include the right to remain silent, the right to be informed
that "anything said can and will be used against the individual in court,"
and the right to an attorney regardless of a suspect's economic status. 62
Miranda rights are required, the Court ruled, from the moment that a
defendant was subject to custodial interrogation by police. 63 The Court
defined such a situation as one of "questioning initiated by law enforcement
officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of
his freedom of action in any significant way." 64  As in Escobedo, the
opinion did not create a bright-line distinction between arrest and nonarrest
scenarios. 65
Underlying the Court's demand for Miranda warnings was its
assumption that an officer's custodial interrogation of a suspect, by its very
57. See id. at 488-89.
58. Id. at 495 (White, J., dissenting) (indicating that the rule established by Escobedo is
a "major step ... to bar from evidence all admissions obtained from an individual suspected
of a crime, whether involuntarily made or not").
59. See Richard A. Rosen, Reflections on Innocence, 2006 Wis. L. REV. 237, 245;
Russell L. Weaver, Miranda at Forty, 44 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 439, 442-44 (2007).
60. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467-68 (1966).
61. See Laurence A. Benner, Requiem for Miranda: The Rehnquist Court's
Voluntariness Doctrine in Historical Perspective, 67 WASH. U. L.Q. 59, 120-21 (1989)
(asserting that Miranda represented a capitulation to the demands of law enforcement
following the outcry from Escobedo); Charles D. Weisselberg, Saving Miranda, 84 CORNELL
L. REv. 109, 121 (1998) ("Miranda was something of a compromise. The Court did not
forbid all interrogations without counsel, as some had invited it to do and as others had
feared it might hold in the wake of Escobedo. Interrogations still could continue, but within
set procedures that would protect Fifth Amendment rights." (footnotes omitted)).
62. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 468-70.
63. Id. at 460-63:




nature, involved a coercive element.66 Chief Justice Warren summarized
the kinds of tactics often utilized by police during interrogations as follows:
When normal procedures fail to produce the needed result, the police may
resort to deceptive stratagems such as giving false legal advice. It is
important to keep the subject off balance, for example, by trading on his
insecurity about himself or his surroundings. The police then persuade,
trick, or cajole him out of exercising his constitutional rights. 67
Chief Justice Warren repudiated such tactics, concluding that this "practice
of incommunicado interrogation is at odds with one of our Nation's most
cherished principles-that the individual may not be compelled to
incriminate himself."'68 By compelling police officials to notify a criminal
of his rights before further interrogation, the Court sought to restore the
proper constitutional balance between a criminal defendant's protections
while in custody and law enforcement's ability to unearth vital facts
through interrogation. 69
The Court's focus on the environment surrounding police interrogations
was critical toward reaching its ultimate conclusion.70  The inherent
coercion at a police station, where investigators operated in private quarters
with no judicial supervision, placed vulnerable defendants at the mercy of
law enforcement officials. 71 In response, the Court instituted Miranda
warnings to counterbalance and diffuse those concerns. The majority
viewed the addition of Miranda rights as part of a balancing formula
between a state's interest to prosecute potential criminals and the
constitutional safeguards required for defendants under the Fifth
Amendment. 72 Accordingly, the announced rule in Miranda did not
remedy. any specific constitutional violation made by police officers.
Instead, it instituted a previolation requirement meant to ease tensions
during custodial interrogation and to prevent any potential Fifth
Amendment abridgment that might result. 73
For opponents of Chief Justice Warren's opinion, the Court's "invention"
of Miranda rights threatened to shatter the basic distinction between
66. Id. at 467 ("We have concluded that without proper safeguards the process of in-
custody interrogation of persons suspected or accused of crime contains inherently
compelling pressures which work to undermine the individual's will to resist and to compel
him to speak where he would not otherwise do so freely.").
67. Id. at 455.
68. Id. at 457-58.
69. Id. at 477-78.
70. Id. at 445 ("An understanding of the nature and setting of this in-custody
interrogation is essential to our decisions today.").
71. Id. at 457 ("It is obvious that such an interrogation environment is created for no
purpose other than to subjugate the individual to the will of his examiner.").
72. See id. at 460 (discussing the importance maintaining a "fair state-individual
balance" (quoting 8 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW 317
(John T. McNaughton ed., rev. ed. 1961) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
73. One subsequent Court opinion referred to Miranda's purpose and effect, perhaps
appropriately so, as "preventive medicine." Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 307 (1985).
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legislature and judiciary.74 Though Miranda did scale back Escobedo's
more radical insinuations, the birth of Miranda warnings, in their mind,
represented the Warren majority's unapologetic attempt to rewrite the
Constitution according to its own policy objectives. 75 The imposition of
Miranda warnings during custodial interrogation would have the practical
effect of deterring suspect cooperation with police. 76 Moreover, Warren's
detractors insisted that it was the legislature's task, not the judiciary's, to
implement broad procedural guidelines for police to counteract general
concerns of police manipulation. 77 The Court's purported reliance on the
Fifth Amendment to conceive its new doctrine, it followed, was nothing
more than a "trompe l'oeil.''78
Though Miranda represented a conservative shift away from Escobedo's
condemnation of all interrogations, it also stood as a powerful emblem of
the Warren Court's boldness to prescribe new criminal defendant
protections according to its own reading of. the Constitution. The final
sentence of Justice John Marshall Harlan II's dissent illustrated the
pervasive concern that the Court was entering territory that could no longer
be adequately checked by the Constitution itself. Borrowing a line from an
opinion written twenty-three years earlier by Justice Robert Jackson, Justice
Harlan warned that "[t]his Court is forever adding new stories to the
temples of constitutional law, and the temples have a way of collapsing
when one story too many is added."'79
2. Miranda's Progeny
Having established a novel Fifth Amendment framework in Miranda,
much of the Court's attention shifted toward honing its definition of
custodial interrogation. For the most part, the post-Warren Court adopted a
narrow approach. In Beckwith v. United States,80 a seven-Justice majority
refused to find a Miranda violation where the government (in this case, the
Internal Revenue Service) targeted a particular suspect and questioned him
in his private residence but, according to the majority, had not restricted his
74. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 531 (White, J., dissenting) ("[Tjhe Court has not discovered or
found the law in making today's decision, nor has it derived it from some irrefutable sources;
what it has done is to make new law and new public policy .....
75. See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
76. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 505 (Harlan, J., dissenting) ("[T]he thrust of [Miranda
warnings] is to negate all pressures, to reinforce the nervous or ignorant suspect, and
ultimately to discourage any confession at all. The aim in short is toward 'voluntariness' in
a utopian sense, or to view it from a different angle, voluntariness with a vengeance.").
77. See Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 460 (2000) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(deriding Miranda's preventive rule as a "legislative achievement"). See generally Joseph D.
Grano, Prophylactic Rules in Criminal Procedure: A Question of Article III Legitimacy, 80
Nw. U. L. REv. 100 (1985).
78. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 510 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
79. Id. at 526 (quoting Douglas v. City of Jeannette, 319 U.S. 157, 181 (1943) (Jackson,
J., concurring)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
80. 425 U.S. 341 (1976).
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freedom in any significant way. 8 1 Later, the Court extended this rule to
police interrogations of suspects at a police station, where the police
informed a defendant that he was a potential suspect but also made clear
that he was not under arrest.82
In California v. Beheler,83 the Court appeared effectively to dismiss
Miranda's application during prearrest detentions altogether. 84 The opinion
elaborated that "the ultimate inquiry [for Miranda] is simply whether there
is a 'formal arrest or restraint on freedom of movement' of the degree
associated with a formal arrest. ' 85 Soon after, appellate courts, seizing on
Beheler's restrictive language, began to deny Miranda challenges during
most prearrest detentions, justifying their decision according to Beheler's
strict correlation between custodial interrogation and formal arrest. 86
Today, commentators often view custody and arrest as being virtually
synonymous within the Miranda rubric. 87
The Court similarly adopted a narrow approach for police interrogations.
In Rhode Island v. Innis, 88 the Court denied Miranda's applicability to a
defendant whose confession resulted from a conversation with police, but
not, in the Court's mind, an interrogative discourse. 89 At first glance, the
Court in Innis endorsed what appeared to be a broad test for interrogation,
defining it as "any words or actions on the part of the police ... that the
police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response
81. See id. at 347 ("Although the 'focus' of an investigation may indeed have been on
Beckwith at the time of the interview... he hardly found himself in the custodial situation
described by the Miranda Court as the basis for its holding."). The Supreme Court had
previously declined to restrict Miranda to the police station. See Orozco v. Texas, 394 U.S.
324, 326-27 (1969) (holding that custodial interrogation in the defendant's bedroom
necessitated Miranda warnings).
82. Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 495 (1977) (per curiam) ("Such a noncustodial
situation is not converted to one in which Miranda applies simply because.., the
questioning took place in a 'coercive environment."').
83. 463 U.S. 1121 (1983) (per curiam).
84. See id. at 1125.
85. Id. (quoting Mathiason, 429 U.S. at 495). The Court's language in California v.
Beheler suggests that Miranda's reliance on an arrest focused exclusively on the nature of an
arrest's custody and degree of physical restraint. Beheler in no way suggested, for instance,
that Miranda also required that an officer possess probable cause, or any other noncustodial
element of an arrest. Instead, the Court deemed an arrest to be the appropriate barometer in
determining when police custody of a suspect produced an inherently coercive setting.
86. See, e.g., United States v. Phillips, 812 F.2d 1355, 1360 (1 1th Cir. 1987); United
States v. Manbeck, 744 F.2d 360, 378-79 & n.30 (4th Cir. 1984).
87. See, e.g., Stephen F. Smith, Activism as Restraint: Lessons from Criminal
Procedure, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1057, 1109 (2002) ("[Tlhe Court... has adopted a strict
definition of 'custody' that generally exempts encounters with police short of actual arrest
from the strictures of Miranda."); George C. Thomas III, An Assault on the Temple of
Miranda, 85 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 807, 825 (1995) (reviewing JOSEPH D. GRANO,
CONFESSIONS, TRUTH, AND THE LAW (1993)) (noting that Miranda's definition of custody is
"the functional equivalent of arrest").
88. 446 U.S. 291 (1980).
89. See id. at 303.
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from the suspect." 90  Thus, interrogation required the form of "express
questioning or its functional equivalent." 9 1
When applying its newly constructed test to the facts in Innis, however,
the Court's holding suggested a far more narrow definition. In Innis, a
group of officers searching for a missing gun placed the suspect in the back
of their patrol car.9 2 Without directing any questions at the suspect, the
officers engaged in a conversation amongst themselves in which one of the
officers mentioned, "[T]here's a lot of handicapped children running around
in this area, and God forbid one of them might find a weapon with shells
and they might hurt themselves." 9 3 The officers continued discussing the
dangers of a missing gun until the suspect finally confessed to the gun's
whereabouts. 94 The majority in Innis refused to look beyond the surface of
the casual police conversation to determine whether the officers' discussion
reasonably elicited the confession. 9 5  The majority found that the
conversation possessed no coercive element or "measure of compulsion
above and beyond that inherent in custody itself' akin to an interrogation.96
Finally, in Quarles, the Justices created a public safety exception to
Miranda warnings. 97 The Court ruled that, where immediate danger still
existed during a police interrogation, law enforcement could delay reciting
Miranda rights following an arrest that would otherwise constitutionally
require such warnings, until they could act to avert the immediate crisis.98
Justice William Rehnquist's opinion justified the exception based on the
Court's view that reciting Miranda warnings during such a dangerous
interval would place too great a strain on police to make an instantaneous
decision as to the suspect's rights during a pressing exigency.99
In Quarles, the police had spotted a potential rape suspect in a
supermarket, having received his physical description from the accuser.100
The police surrounded and handcuffed the defendant before conducting a
brief search.101 During the course of their search, the police discovered that
the defendant possessed an empty gun holster, which immediately
prompted them to ask for the gun's whereabouts without first reciting
Miranda warnings. 10 2 The defendant gave up the location of the gun, a
90. Id. at 301 (footnote omitted).
91. Id. at 300-01.
92. Id. at 294.
93. Id. at 294-95 (internal quotation marks omitted).
94. Id. at 295.
95. Id. at 302 (alluding to the fact that the "conversation was, at least in form, nothing
more than a dialogue between the two officers to which no response from the respondent
was invited").
96. Id. at 300.
97. New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 651 (1984).
98. Id. at 656-57.
99. Id.





statement later determined to be self-incriminating after the government
charged the defendant with criminal possession of a weapon. 10 3
It is noteworthy that the majority opinion determined the suspect in
Quarles to be under arrest based solely on the fact that the police
handcuffed and surrounded him in the supermarket. 104  The Court
concluded that these measures subjected the defendant to a degree of
restraint comparable to a formal arrest under Beheler.105 Only after the
defendant uttered the self-incriminating statement did the police formally
arrest him. 10 6
Overall, the circumstances in Quarles were markedly different than those
involved in Miranda. The detention took place outside the police station,
where the officer's conduct was exposed to public scrutiny. 107  Most
important, the police interrogation was not focused on securing a
conviction, but on averting an immediate danger.108 Their objective was to
play the role of peacekeeper, a duty that the state precisely authorizes police
to carry out during such exigent circumstances.
The Court concluded that the unique set of factors in Quarles had shifted
the balance of interests in favor of the state. 10 9 The Justices' institutional
concern, ensuring that police officers carry out their peacekeeping duty
during dangerous intervals, outweighed Miranda's concern regarding
confessions produced through coercion. o10 To be sure, the police conduct
in Quarles did involve coercive tactics worthy of Miranda's custodial
standard. However, from the Court's perspective, the police objective,
given the circumstances, warranted such measures.' l
103. Id. at 652-53.
104. Id. at 655.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 652.
107. See id.
108. See id.
109. See id. at 657-60. Justice William Rehnquist elaborated on the balance shift:
Procedural safeguards which deter a suspect from responding were deemed
acceptable in Miranda in order to protect the Fifth Amendment privilege; when the
primary social cost of those added protections is the possibility of fewer
convictions, the Miranda majority was willing to bear that cost. Here... the cost
would have been something more than merely the failure to obtain evidence useful
in convicting Quarles.
Id. at 657.
110. id. at 656-58. The Court's allowance of an exception to Miranda based on its
concern for public safety (including the safety of the officers) involved similar theoretical
and practical considerations, as did the Warren Court's justification in Terry for an exception
to the probable cause requirement under the Fourth Amendment. See infra Part I.B. 1.
11. Quarles, 467 U.S. at 656-59. There currently exists a dispute among circuit courts
as to the breadth of circumstances covered by the Quarles exception. The U.S. Courts of
Appeals for the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Circuits have held that only exigent circumstances
may warrant a public safety exception to Miranda. See United States v. Williams, 483 F.3d
425, 428-29 (6th Cir. 2007); United States v. Mobley, 40 F.3d 688, 693 (4th Cir. 1994);
United States v. Rabom, 872 F.2d 589, 595 (5th Cir. 1989). Meanwhile, the U.S. Courts of
Appeals for the First, Eighth, and Tenth Circuits have ruled that Quarles should apply so
long as there exists inherently dangerous material (such as a hidden weapon) at the place of
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Writing for the majority in Quarles, Justice Rehnquist possessed an
exceedingly skeptical attitude toward Miranda's constitutional validity,
referring to Miranda as "the prophylactic rule protecting the Fifth
Amendment's privilege against self-incrimination," not as a constitutional
rule in itself." 2  In light of an increasingly conservative Court, many
Supreme Court observers speculated whether Quarles, among other
opinions, 11 3 would ultimately lead to Miranda's demise. 114
Speculation surrounding Miranda's future remained potent until 2000,
when the Court finally affirmed the decision's constitutional stature and
assured its continued survival in Dickerson v. United States.115 Ironically,
it was now Chief Justice Rehnquist, perhaps Miranda's most enduring
critic, who wrote for the majority in Dickerson. In his opinion, the Chief
Justice justified Miranda's constitutional legitimacy according to the
indisputable fact that it had "become embedded in routine police practice to
the point where the warnings have become part of our national culture."" 16
Though the actual holding in Miranda has not been undermined, its
progeny have produced a definition of custodial interrogation that aligns
closely to the type of situations analogous to a police station interrogation.
Miranda warnings may still apply outside the confines of a police station
where the setting possesses an inherently coercive environment. 117 As the
Supreme Court provided more recently in Thompson v. Keohane,118 the
current inquiry for Miranda asks whether factual circumstances present a
setting in which a defendant reasonably believed he was not at liberty to
custodial interrogation, but that an ostensible emergency is not necessary. See United States
v. Liddell, 517 F.3d 1007, 1009-10 (8th Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 627 (2008);
United States v. Fox, 393 F.3d 52, 60 (1st Cir. 2004), vacated on other grounds, 545 U.S.
1125 (2005); United States v. Phillips, 94 F. App'x 796, 801 (10th Cir. 2004), vacated on
other grounds, 543 U.S. 1101 (2005). This Note's treatment of the public safety exception
aligns closer to the latter's argument than the former. Though the possibility cannot be too
remote to render the danger's likelihood minimal, the existence of inherently dangerous
material may be probative of the need of immediate police action as in Quarles, where there
existed an "immediate necessity of ascertaining the whereabouts of a gun which they had
every reason to believe" constituted a danger to public safety. Quarles, 467 U.S. at 657.
112. Quarles, 467 U.S. at 657. The Court first characterized Miranda as a prophylactic
rule in Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 439 (1974), once again courtesy of a Justice
Rehnquist opinion. See Lawrence Rosenthal, Against Orthodoxy: Miranda Is Not
Prophylactic and the Constitution Is Not Perfect, 10 CHAP. L. REv. 579, 579-80 (2007).
113. See Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 462-65 (1994) (Scalia, J., concurring);
Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 317-18 (1985).
114. See, e.g., Alfredo Garcia, Is Miranda Dead, Was It Overruled, or Is It Irrelevant?, 10
ST. THOMAS L. REV. 461, 462-63 (1998); Daniel P. Collins, Farewell Miranda?, 1995 PuB.
INT. L. REv. 185, 202-06 (reviewing GRANO, supra note 87); Steven Andrew Drizin, Note,
Fifth Amendment-Will the Public Safety Exception Swallow the Miranda Exclusionary
Rule?: New York v. Quarles, 75 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 692, 713-14 (1984); see also
William T. Pizzi & Morris B. Hoffman, Taking Miranda's Pulse, 58 VAND. L. REV. 813,
822-24 (2005).
115. 530 U.S. 428, 432 (2000).
116. Id. at 443.
117. See Orozco v. Texas, 394 U.S. 324, 326-27 (1969); see also supra note 81 and
accompanying text.
118. 516 U.S. 99(1995).
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leave during an interrogation that the police should have known might lead
to self-incrimination. 19 Based on the Court's body of precedent, this
setting is typically invoked during circumstances in which the police detain
a suspect in a manner analogous to custodial arrest.1 20
B. A History of Terry
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated,
and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause .... 121
With respect to unreasonable searches and seizures prohibited by the
Fourth Amendment, the Court's decision in Terry provided police with a
new, limited authority to frisk potential suspects on the street without
probable cause. The Justices implemented this new exception to the Fourth
Amendment's probable cause standard in response to contemporary societal
pressures to restore peace in urban communities following the destructive
race riots of the late 1960s. Part I.B.1 analyzes the Court's conception of
Terry and the parameters of its new exception to the Fourth Amendment.
Part I.B.2 analyzes the post-Warren era expansion of Terry and its
implications on future jurisprudence.
1. The Decision
By the time the Warren Court announced its decision in Terry during the
tumultuous summer of 1968, two years after Miranda, the Justices' tenor
had noticeably changed. Absent were bold proclamations revolutionizing
criminal suspect protections under the Constitution. 122 The Court's new,
subdued tone can be traced to a series of developments taking root across
the nation during the late 1960s.
During the interlude between Miranda and Terry, the country endured
increased social unrest as race riots spread rapidly in cities across the
nation. During the "long, hot summer of 1967," 128 cities, most
prominently Newark and Detroit, experienced varying degrees of racial
rioting and civil unrest that ultimately shattered the infrastructure of their
low-income neighborhoods.' 2 3 The assassination of Martin Luther King,
119. See id. at 112. Courts must now "consider the circumstances surrounding the
interrogation and then determine whether a reasonable person would have felt at liberty to
leave." Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 659 (2004) (citing Keohane, 516 U.S. at
112).
120. See supra notes 83-87, 104-06 and accompanying text.
121. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
122. See, e.g., Yale Kamisar, How Earl Warren's Twenty-Two Years in Law Enforcement
Affected His Work as Chief Justice, 3 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 11, 31 (2005) ("Earl Warren
stepped down from the Supreme Court in June 1969. But the so-called revolution in
American criminal procedure had already ended. It had done so a full year earlier when the
Court handed down its opinions in the 'stop-and-frisk' cases-Terry v. Ohio and two
companion cases." (footnote omitted)).
123. POWE, supra note 48, at 274-78 (internal quotation marks omitted); Charles Sumner
Stone, Jr., Thucydides' Law of History, or From Kerner, 1968 to Hacker, 1992, 71 N.C. L.
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Jr., in April of 1968 sparked a new wave of riots in urban black
neighborhoods, increasing tensions between police and the black
community. 124 In fact, amidst the Justices' drafting of the Terry opinion,
Washington, D.C., witnessed some of the fiercest rioting in the city's
history. 125
In the political arena, President Lyndon B. Johnson, a close ally of
several members of the Court, announced in March of 1968 that he would
not seek a second term as President. 126 Meanwhile, a revived Republican
Party was developing a strategy to seize the White House in 1968,
predicated, at least in part, on a crusade against the Warren Court. 127
Indeed, few decisions had drawn more fire from Republican politicians than
Miranda.128  The Republicans' prospect for victory appeared almost
assured when, only five days before the Court handed down its decision in
Terry, Robert F. Kennedy was assassinated at the Ambassador Hotel in
California in the midst of his bid for the Democratic nomination for
President. 129  The news of Kennedy's death only exacerbated existing
worries about the degree of social unrest throughout the country. The
circumstances surrounding Terry placed the Justices in a precarious
situation, as they well understood the potential impact that the Terry
decision might have in an unstable political climate. 130
The facts in Terry, while occurring in 1963, illustrated the problems
plaguing urban communities during the uneasy moments of the late 1960s.
During a patrol of downtown Cleveland, Officer Martin McFadden, a white
police detective of nearly forty years, spotted two black men acting
REV. 1711, 1717-19 (1993) (describing the hostile state of race relations during the late
1960s).
124. See Earl C. Dudley, Jr., Terry v. Ohio, the Warren Court, and the Fourth
Amendment: A Law Clerk's Perspective, 72 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 891, 891-92 (1998).
125. Id.
126. JIM NEWTON, JUSTICE FOR ALL: EARL WARREN AND THE NATION HE MADE 487
(2006).
127. See, e.g., Corinna Barrett Lain, Countermajoritarian Hero or Zero? Rethinking the
Warren Court's Role in the Criminal Procedure Revolution, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 1361, 1424
& n.323 (2004) (noting that presidential candidate Richard "Nixon wrote a position paper on
crime in which he blamed most of the country's woes on the Supreme Court" and criticized
Escobedo and Miranda as undermining police authority while empowering criminals); see
also Lewis R. Katz, Terry v. Ohio at Thirty-Five: A Revisionist View, 74 Miss. L.J. 423,
438-40 (2004).
128. See Schulhofer, supra note 48, at 164 ("For Nixon, Miranda came at the perfect time
and provided just the highly visible opening he needed."); supra note 127 and accompanying
text.
129. See Katz, supra note 127, at 438.
130. See id. at 436 n.77. Only three months before the Court made its ruling in Terry, the
Kerner Commission, established by President Lyndon B. Johnson to investigate the causes of
the crippling race riots, released its report. The report found that the escalating tensions
between urban blacks and local police played a major role in the outbreak of violence. Id.;
see also Andrew E. Taslitz, Stories of Fourth Amendment Disrespect: From Elian to the
Internment, 70 FORDHAM L. REV. 2257, 2258, 2263 (2002) (discussing the Kerner Report in
historical context and in relation to Terry). See generally Stone, supra note 123 (describing
the Kerner Commission's impact and legacy).
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suspiciously in front of a store window. 13 1 Believing that the men were
planning to rob the store, the officer stopped the two men as they walked
toward a third suspicious individual. 132 Based on his observations, the
police officer patted down the three men and discovered that two of them,
John W. Terry and Richard Chilton, possessed weapons.133 McFadden then
brought the two men to the police station where they were charged with
carrying concealed weapons. 134  When the defendants challenged the
evidence's admissibility based on McFadden's lack of probable cause, the
Ohio courts denied the defendants' motion. 135 On appeal to the U.S.
Supreme Court, Terry repeated the assertion that, absent probable cause,
Officer McFadden had no authority to search and had violated his Fourth
Amendment rights. 136
Still inclined to provide firm protections for criminal defendants, Chief
Justice Warren's first draft of the Terry opinion allied steadfastly with the
proposition that only probable cause could justify frisking a person for
weapons. 137 The draft contained lengthy, drawn-out instructions for police
officers similar to those provided by his Miranda opinion. 138 Nonetheless,
Warren's first draft upheld Terry's conviction, since it reasoned that Officer
McFadden's suspicion satisfied the threshold of probable cause-a
conclusion undoubtedly driven by the sensitivity of the issue at the time.139
When Warren distributed his initial draft, most of the Justices rejected the
opinion's adherence to the probable cause standard and demanded broader
authority for police to search potential criminal suspects.14 0 In response to
the Justices' consensus, Justice William Brennan aided Chief Justice
Warren in crafting a revised opinion that veered Terry in an entirely new
direction.' 4 1 The final version of the opinion, endorsed by six Justices
altogether, carved out an exception to the Fourth Amendment's probable
cause requirement where exigent circumstances warranted a brief but
limited frisk by police. 142
131. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1968). Chief Justice Earl Warren's opinion in Terry
notably omitted the defendant's race, no doubt an indication of his concern for racial tension
while drafting the opinion. See Anthony C. Thompson, Stopping the Usual Suspects: Race
and the Fourth Amendment, 74 N.Y.U. L. REv. 956, 962-73 (1999).
132. Terry, 392 U.S. at 6-7.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 7.
135. Id. at 7-8.
136. Id. at 8. A few weeks after the U.S. Supreme Court agreed to hear the case, Richard
Chilton was killed in a confrontation with police after attempting to rob a drugstore. See
John Q. Barrett, Terry v. Ohio: The Fourth Amendment Reasonableness of Police Stops and
Frisks Based on Less than Probable Cause, in CRIMINAL PROCEDURE STORIES, supra note
48, at 295, 300.
137. See Barrett, supra note 136, at 304; Frank Rudy Cooper, The Spirit of 1968: Toward
Abolishing Terry Doctrine, 31 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 539, 542 (2007).
138. See Barrett, supra note 136, at 304; Cooper, supra note 137, at 542.
139. See Barrett, supra note 136, at 305; Cooper, supra note 137, at 542.
140. See Barrett, supra note 136, at 304-05; Cooper, supra note 137, at 542.
141. See Barrett, supra note 136, at 305-06; Cooper, supra note 137, at 542.
142. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 24-27 (1968).
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The narrow exception articulated in Terry contained a two-part analysis.
First, a police officer could only conduct a frisk lacking probable cause
when he held a reasonable suspicion of imminent danger either to himself
or to others nearby. 143 The Court announced that it would review the
reasonableness of police activity under an objective standard: "would the
facts available to the officer at the moment of the seizure or the search
'warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that the action taken was
appropriate?"' 144  Any justification lacking a reasonable suspicion of
immediate danger, the Court warned, "would invite intrusions upon
constitutionally guaranteed rights based on nothing more substantial than
inarticulate hunches," a basis too feeble to override a defendant's
constitutional protections. 145
Second, the Court allowed only a limited search to the extent that it was
"reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the
interference in the first place."'146 Once the fear of danger was averted, no
frisk would be valid under Terry.147 The Court authorized the frisk of the
suspect only as a necessary measure to prevent injury to police or
bystanders, not as a routine investigatory tool. Accordingly, the
admissibility of evidence found during the frisk would only be an incidental
product of Terry's primary aim-to protect civilians from immediate harm.
Most important, a police officer could only conduct a limited, superficial
frisk of a suspect for the purpose of securing weapons or other dangerous
material.148 A pat down of the suspect would be reasonable, but any search
beyond the outer surface of his clothing would exceed police authority. 149
Having permitted police action against a suspect where probable cause did
not exist, the Terry Court viewed the limited breadth of the frisk as the
appropriate trade-off to best preserve balance between state and individual
interests. 150
The six-Justice majority in Terry only approved of a police frisk, not the
additional "stop," which would have encompassed the power to interrogate
143. Id. at 20-21, 28-29 (justifying the exception because a police officer's duty to
investigate suspicions involves "an entire rubric of police conduct-necessarily swift action
predicated upon the on-the-spot observations of the officer on the beat-which historically
has not been ... subjected to" probable cause requirements). The Court's discussion of
immediate danger possessed similar language to that which it would eventually use sixteen
years later in New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649 (1984). See supra notes 97-111 and
accompanying text.
144. Terry, 392 U.S. at 21-22 (quoting Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 162
(1925)).
145. Id. at 22. The term "reasonable suspicion" was ironically coined by Justice William
Douglas, the lone dissenter in Terry. See id. at 37 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
146. Id. at 20 (majority opinion).
147. See id. at 30-31.
148. Id. at 29-31.
149. Id.
150. See Godsey, supra note 2 1, at 746; Craig S. Lerner, Reasonable Suspicion and Mere
Hunches, 59 VAND. L. REv. 407, 424-26 (2006).
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the suspect. 15 1  The majority's aim-to create a narrow, but effective
exception to the probable cause requirement-produced an exceedingly
cautious attitude toward embracing the additional "stop," which would have
only disrupted the delicate balance already achieved. 152 Thus, the original
Terry holding did not consider a scenario in which the suspect would be
subjected to both a frisk and police interrogation. 153 This likely explains
why the majority felt no need to address any potential Miranda concerns
that might arise during a coercive Terry setting. In fact, not one of the four
opinions issued by the Justices in Terry even mentioned Miranda. 1
54
Chief Justice Warren acknowledged that the circumstances then
surrounding the country played an influential role in fueling the Court's
novel approach. 155 Domestic pressures to restore peace were simply too
great for the Court to "blind [itself] to the need for law enforcement officers
to protect themselves and other prospective victims of violence in situations
where they may lack probable cause for an arrest."' 156 As a result, the Court
shifted the balance in favor of the government, despite trying to limit that
authority as much as possible.
Indeed, the Court's strains in reaching its conclusion were evident from
the opinion itself. As one of Chief Justice Warren's biographers has
pointed out, "[o]ne cannot read [the opinion] without being struck by its
caveats, its revealing 'howevers' and 'on the other hands." ' 157 Another
observer notes that "[t]he tension between idealism and realism was
apparent in the very structure of Warren's opinion for the Court in
Terry."'1 58 Though it approved only a limited frisk, the Court's delicate
balance nonetheless established a framework that provided police with a
new and forceful justification for invasive searches. 159 In retrospect, one
151. Terry, 392 U.S. at 19 n.16. The term "stop and frisk" has become synonymous with
Terry based on subsequent rulings by the Court. However, the original opinion specifically
rejected a stop and frisk framework. See POWE, supra note 48, at 406.
152. When referring to a stop, the Court was not referring to the physical stop of a
suspect, which was, to be sure, a necessary prerequisite for their ability to frisk that suspect.
Instead, a stop in the Terry context referred to the officer's right to question or detain a
suspect beyond the initial frisk. See id. at 10.
153. Justices Byron White and John Marshall Harlan II conversely asserted, in their
respective concurring opinions, that the authority to stop and the authority to frisk were
logically connected; that the power to frisk necessarily implied the initial right to stop. See
id. at 31-34 (Harlan, J., concurring); id. at 34-35 (White, J., concurring). The Court would
eventually assume this view of Terry four years later in Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143
(1972). See infra note 175 and accompanying text.
154. See generally Terry, 392 U.S. 1.
155. Id. at 9-10 ("We would be less than candid if we did not acknowledge that this
question thrusts to the fore difficult and troublesome issues regarding a sensitive area of
police activity-issues which have never before been squarely presented to this Court.").
156. Id. at24.
157. NEWTON, supra note 126, at 489.
158. Mark Tushnet, The Warren Court as History: An Interpretation, in THE WARREN
COURT IN HISTORICAL AND POLITICAL PERSPECTIVE 1, 23 (Mark Tushnet ed., 1993).
159. Terry, 392 U.S. at 27 ("[T]here must be a narrowly drawn authority to permit a
reasonable search for weapons for the protection of the police officer, where he has reason to
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might conclude that "[t]he same chief justice who had outraged police with
Miranda handed them wide latitude and power with Terry."'160
Finally, Terry did not so much recognize a type of search as it did a
justification. To be sure, the opinion articulated certain limits to the actual
conduct permitted by Terry; 161 nevertheless its focus remained on the set of
circumstances that would justify police activity akin to Officer McFadden's
conduct. 162 The Court's decision ultimately cast a wide umbrella over an
infinite number of scenarios in which observations of suspicious activity
made by police justified extemporaneous searches. 163 In doing so, Terry
produced an amorphous category of searches, not limited to a particular set
of facts, that today have become routine for police to use. 164
2. Terry's Progeny
In subsequent cases, as the post-Warren Court remained cognizant of the
Terry majority's painstaking effort to accentuate a delicate balance, the
Justices repeatedly stressed the importance of preserving Terry's
compromise. 165 In Dunaway v. New York, 16 6 the Court emphasized that it
had "been careful to maintain [Terry's] narrow scope," mindful of the fact
that a police frisk could only be a limited intrusion of a suspect's privacy in
order to investigate a reasonable suspicion of danger. 167 In Dunaway,
Justice Brennan's opinion rejected the government's argument that Terry
permitted police to bring a suspect back to the station when the officers
lacked probable cause.168 By forcing a suspect to accompany officers to the
police station, the action crossed the threshold from a Terry stop to an
arrest. 169 Since Terry was an exception to the probable cause requirement,
and an arrest required probable cause, a valid Terry stop could not venture
into the realm of arrest authority. 170
Yet, while repeatedly underscoring Terry's limited nature and scope, the
Court slowly began to loosen its strings, making deliberate alterations to
Terry's fragile balance. 17 1 Only four years after its ruling in Terry, the
believe that he is dealing with an armed and dangerous individual, regardless of whether he
has probable cause to arrest the individual .....
160. NEWTON, supra note 126, at 489.
161. See supra notes 148-50 and accompanying text.
162. See supra notes 143-47 and accompanying text.
163. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 15 ("No judicial opinion can comprehend the protean variety
of the street encounter, and we can only judge the facts of the case before us.").
164. See Estrada, supra note 21, at 311 ("A dexterous and amorphous creature, distinct
from freedom and divorced from arrest, the Terry stop thrives in this peculiar no-man's
land.").
165. See id. at 283-84.
166. 442 U.S. 200 (1979).
167. Id. at210-11.
168. Id. at211-14.
169. Id. at 212 (stating that "the detention of petitioner was in important respects
indistinguishable from a traditional arrest").
170. See supra notes 142-43 and accompanying text.
171. See Estrada, supra note 21, at 284-86.
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Court intimated in Adams v. Williams172 that a frisk need not result solely
from the suspicion of immediate danger. 173 Instead, the Justices suggested
that a reasonable duty to investigate could alone justify a Terry stop.' 74
Adams marked an important early modification to the Court's Terry
jurisprudence. First, in Adams, the Court officially endorsed the position
that Terry not only authorized a frisk, but also police authority to stop and
detain the suspect briefly for additional questioning.' 75 Second, the Court
did not find it necessary to distinguish the facts of Adams, where the
officer's reasonable suspicion derived from a tip provided by a different
source, from Terry where the officer relied on his own observations' 76
Finally, the officer's interaction with the defendant did not involve a dire
need to avert immediate danger as mentioned in Terry. The defendant in
Adams was sitting in his car with the windows rolled up when the officer
approached him. 177 The Court's summary of facts provided little indication
that the defendant was on the verge of committing a felony.178
Based on the majority's view that Terry permitted the type of police
action exercised in Adams, the Court implicitly adopted the view that police
authority to conduct stop and frisks was routine in light of their basic
investigatory duties, rather than a rare exception to be utilized only in cases
of immediate danger. 179 Adams shifted the analytical focus of Terry away
from exigent circumstances to a basic reasonableness inquiry of the
officer's search given the totality of circumstances involved.
Building on Adams, the Court began to loosen its restrictions on the kinds
of evidence that might be admissible based on a stop and frisk. Originally,
in Terry, the majority opinion had suggested that only securing weapons
could be the explicit aim during a Terry frisk, since its very purpose was to
avert an immediate danger. 18° But as law enforcement attention shifted
172. 407 U.S. 143 (1972).
173. See id. at 147-49.
174. Id. at 145-46.
175. Id.; see also David A. Harris, Frisking Every Suspect: The Withering of Terry, 28
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1, 23 (1994) ("Adams took the point further: when the offense suspected
involves the possibility of armed violence (recall that the informant reported the defendant
had a gun at his waist), a frisk may follow a stop without any pause in between."). Because
the Court incorporated the "stop" almost immediately following Terry, and to avoid
unnecessary confusion, this Note subsequently refers to the rule announced in Terry as a
"stop and frisk." Indeed, the term "stop and frisk" today has become synonymous with
Terry itself
176. See Adams, 407 U.S. at 144-45; Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 5-7 (1968).
177. Adams, 407 U.S. at 145. The tip indicated that the defendant possessed a gun but
provided little information regarding an impending crime beyond mere possession of a
weapon. Id. at 144-45.
178. Id.
179. See, e.g., Stephen A. Saltzburg, Terry v. Ohio: A Practically Perfect Doctrine, 72
ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 911, 944 (1998) ("Adams v. Williams did more than reiterate Terry. It
seemed to bolster the 'investigatory stop' part of stop and frisk .... ").
180. Terry, 392 U.S. at 30-31 (stating that a limited frisk "is a reasonable search under
the Fourth Amendment, and any weapons seized may properly be introduced in evidence
against the person from whom they were taken").
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away from race riots in the 1970s and 1980s in favor of the war on drugs,
the Justices quickly embraced the government's contention that drugs could
also be the explicit target and sole fruit of a Terry search. 181 The Court's
broad take on Terry's "reasonableness" requirement in the post-Adams era
also led it to approve the admissibility of evidence produced by a frisk that
was conducted after a mere traffic stop violation. 82 Such circumstances,
the three dissenters contended, undermined the compromise struck by
Terry. 18
3
Meanwhile, the Court also began to approve some police searches that
exceeded Terry's original sanction of a brief and limited frisk. In both
Michigan v. Summers' 84 and United States v. Sharpe,185 the Court permitted
an extended detention of a suspect under Terry, one that exceeded the scope
permitted in Terry or even Adams.186 Despite reiterating Terry's call for a
limited intrusion, the majority nonetheless approved longer police
detentions based on the state "interest in preventing flight in the event that
incriminating evidence is found" and also "the interest in minimizing the
risk of harm to the officers."' 87 The Justices would consistently reassert the
notion that police conduct under Terry must be "the least intrusive means
reasonably available" to fulfill the stop's end, but deciphering what exactly
constituted that means or, for that matter, the end, remained an open and
hotly contested issue.18 8 Ultimately, the Court's "end justifies the means"
rationale, evident by the statements in Summers, would later become a
crucial source of validation for appellate courts when justifying even more
intrusive police searches. 189
Though somewhat mild compared to future applications of Terry, the
Supreme Court rulings in the 1970s and early 1980s established a broader
context in which Terry stop and frisks applied. During this period, the
181. See United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 703 (1983); United States v. Mendenhall,
446 U.S. 544, 561-62 (1980) (Powell, J., concurring); see also United States v. Hensley, 469
U.S. 221, 226 (1985) (defining the Terry rule as that where "law enforcement agents may
briefly stop a moving automobile, to investigate a reasonable suspicion that its occupants are
involved in criminal activity," essentially acknowledging the shift away from Terry's
demand for looming danger in favor of a broad test that included virtually any criminal acts).
United States v. Hensley ruled that law enforcement possessed authority under Terry to
investigate a suspect for past crimes (felonies), even if the suspect posed no immediate
danger at the time of the stop. 469 U.S. at 229.
182. See Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 108-11 (1977). In Pennsylvania v.
Mimms, police officers conducted a routine traffic stop under Terry when they noticed an
expired license plate. Id. at 107. After stopping the vehicle, the officers ordered the
defendant out of the car, at which time they noticed a large bulge under his jacket. Id. This
observation provided the police with reasonable suspicion to frisk the defendant; a search
that ultimately produced a weapon. Id. at 107-09.
183. Id. at 115-24 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
184. 452 U.S. 692 (1981).
185. 470 U.S. 675 (1985).
186. See id. at 685-86; Summers, 452 U.S. at 710-11 (Stewart, J., dissenting); see also
Estrada, supra note 21, at 284-85.
187. Summers, 452 U.S. at 702.
188. Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500 (1983).
189. See infra notes 222-29 and accompanying text.
2802 ( ol. 77
BERKEMER REVISITED
Court shifted away from its original conception of Terry as a tool to prevent
immediate dangers toward a view that Terry searches could be legitimized
as an investigative norm during routine patrols. This change allowed
appellate courts gradually to extend the scope of stop and frisks to an
endless array of circumstances. 190 In the end, the theoretical balance
originally struck in Terry was simply too delicate to withstand the force of
its underlying, expansive logic as applied by courts in a practical setting. 19 1
C. Berkemer v. McCarty: Its Holding and Legacy
In their respective origins, Miranda and Terry dealt with separate
constitutional inquiries. Terry provided police with a new justification to
briefly frisk potential suspects on the street to avert danger, while Miranda
involved protections for suspects during highly coercive police
interrogations. Their significance and scope were never meant to
intertwine, a point demonstrated by Chief Justice Warren's adherence to the
view that Terry did not permit an officer to interrogate a suspect during or
following the frisk. 192
Perhaps just as important, however, both Miranda and Terry were
products of the Warren Court-a Court bent on implementing broad and
elaborate guidelines that lacked transparency in their practical effect on the
nation's criminal investigative procedure law. 193  Each doctrine was
fashioned from a balance of the same institutional factors, a state's interest
to investigate and prosecute criminals and a criminal suspect's proper
safeguards according to the Constitution.194 Both succeeded to a more
conservative Court, one willing to expand on police authority while less
sympathetic to the claims of criminal defendants.195 Thus, lurking beneath
Miranda and Terry's ostensible differences rested an intricate tension that
would manifest itself in later years, long after Chief Justice Warren had left
the bench.
In 1984, the Court considered its first and only case to date implicating a
potential conflict between Miranda and Terry. In Berkemer v. McCarty, an
officer's routine traffic stop produced a confession by the defendant that he
was driving under the influence of drugs and alcohol. 196 The defendant
subsequently challenged the admissibility of his statements in court,
arguing that the police questioning subjected him to custodial interrogation
and that his confession was inadmissible based on the lack of Miranda
warnings. ' 97
190. See supra notes 172-87 and accompanying text.
191. See Dudley, supra note 124, at 897.
192. See supra notes 151-54 and accompanying text.
193. The only change to the Court between Miranda and Terry was President Johnson's
appointment of Justice Thurgood Marshall, who replaced Justice Tom Clark in 1967. See
NEWTON, supra note 126, at 480.
194. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
195. See supra Part I.A.2, B.2.




In Berkemer, the Supreme Court rejected the defendant's claim and ruled
as a basic principle that routine traffic stops, akin to Terry stops, do not
automatically trigger a suspect's Miranda rights. 98 The Court perceived a
traffic stop as "temporary and brief."' 99 Meanwhile, the police intrusion of
the defendant's privacy in Berkemer was limited. 200 Finally, the officer's
questioning was routine.20 1 Based on the facts specific to the Berkemer
case and the Court's perception that the defendant's encounter was
indicative of most traffic stops, the Court ruled that the defendant was not
subject to the kind of coercive elements targeted by Miranda.20 2
The opinion's handling of Miranda reflected the Court's ongoing
hesitancy to extend custodial interrogation beyond the type of inherently
coercive setting envisioned by Miranda itself.20 3 The Court was loath to
grant "talismanic power" to Miranda in circumstances where police
interrogations did not possess the same coercive characteristics as police
interrogations at a police station. 204 The decision alluded to the distinction
between private interrogations in a police station, where a suspect would be
vulnerable to unchecked abuse and pressure, and public detentions on the
highway, where witnesses and observers could monitor police activity. 205
The public quality of a traffic stop, the Court concluded, lacked the inherent
coercion envisioned by Miranda.20 6 Thus, the routine, public nature of the
stop, devoid of the institutional fears articulated by Miranda, swung the
balance in favor of the state's ability to investigate potential criminal
activity.
Berkemer addressed only one type of Terry stop in which a defendant
might challenge a confession based on Miranda. The facts in Berkemer
provided a limited stop and frisk, making it relatively easy for the Justices
to dismiss the defendant's claim. Beyond the limited circumstances of the
case, the Court refused to create a categorical rule for all Terry stops. 207
Instead, it allowed lower federal and state courts to rely on their own
discretion, indicating that any successful Miranda challenge would likely
require evidence that the stop was not "temporary and brief' and that the
suspect felt "completely at the mercy of the police. '20 8 In doing so, the
Court acknowledged that its allowance for judicial discretion would leave
some level of uncertainty, noting that the decision "will mean that the
police and lower courts will continue occasionally to have difficulty
198. Id. at 437-39.
199. Id. at 437.
200. Id. at 441-42.
201. Id. at 437-38.
202. Id. at 438-39.
203. See supra notes 80-96 and accompanying text.
204. Berkemer, 468 U.S. at 437.
205. Id. at 438 ("This exposure to public view both reduces the ability of an unscrupulous
policeman to use illegitimate means to elicit self-incriminating statements and diminishes the
motorist's fear that, if he does not cooperate, he will be subjected to abuse.").
206. Id.
207. Id. at 440-41.
208. Id. at 437-38.
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deciding exactly when a suspect has been taken into custody" for purposes
of his Miranda rights.209
Without declaring a comprehensive rule, however, the opinion
implemented a significant barrier for Miranda claims during Terry stops.
The Court's narrow holding, to be sure, found support in the limited
circumstances present in the facts of Berkemer. But the unanimous opinion
was also predicated, in part, on the Justices' assumption that Terry stops, in
all forms, would not rise to the level worthy of Miranda warnings.210 The
Court explicitly noted in Berkemer that "[t]he comparatively nonthreatening
character of detentions of this sort explains the absence of any suggestion in
our opinions that Terry stops are subject to the dictates of Miranda.' '211
Indeed, the Court's ruling may have been limited to motor vehicle stops,
but the analysis and the dicta it provided to lower courts implicated the
entire spectrum of potential Terry encounters. 212
In retrospect, Berkemer's treatment of Terry produced somewhat of a
judicial irony. The opinion ultimately widened Terry's influence by ousting
Miranda considerations from most stop and frisk interactions. However,
Berkemer's legacy did not reflect its author's intention. Writing for a
unanimous Court in Berkemer, Justice Thurgood Marshall's opinion
expressed a very narrow view of Terry. Marshall had dissented in Adams,
United States v. Mendenhall,2 13 Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 2 14 Summers, and
Sharpe, and had consistently disagreed with the Court's expansion of Terry
since its inception.215 As he wrote the unanimous Berkemer opinion in
1984, Justice Marshall still subscribed to a limited view of Terry, and used
his opinion in Berkemer to reaffirm that brevity in scope. It was because of
this narrow view that Justice Marshall believed Terry would not implicate
Miranda.216
Justice Marshall's explanation, however, did not accurately reflect the
Court's general attitude toward Terry.217 The stark difference was even
more apparent at the appellate level, where circuit courts had begun to
expand Terry well beyond the boundaries addressed by the Supreme
Court.2 18 As a consequence, the only Supreme Court opinion on record to
209. Id. at 441.
210. Id. at 440.
211. Id.
212. See infra note 259 and accompanying text.
213. 446 U.S. 544 (1980).
214. 434 U.S. 106 (1977).
215. See, e.g., Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 162 (1972) (Marshall, J., dissenting)
(lamenting even then that "the delicate balance that Terry struck was simply too delicate, too
susceptible to the 'hydraulic pressures' of the day," as "the balance struck in Terry is now
heavily weighted in favor of the government"). Justice Thurgood Marshall's remarks in
Adams v. Williams expressed his view that Justice Douglas was perhaps correct to oppose
the Court's decision in Terry from the outset. See Adams, 407 U.S. at 161-62; Terry v. Ohio,
392 U.S. 1, 39 (1968) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
216. See supra note 211 and accompanying text.
217. See supra notes 172-89 and accompanying text.
218. See infra notes 223-25 and accompanying text.
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address the conflict between Miranda and Terry did not accurately reflect
the true application of each doctrine, nor did it provide much clarity on how
the two might interact in a practical setting.
D. Emergence of the New Terry in the Post-Berkemer Era
Parts L.A and I.B of this Note traced the separate developments of
Miranda and Terry, while Part 1.C introduced and analyzed the Supreme
Court's first and only impression of a potential collision between the two
doctrines-a ruling in which the Court largely dismissed a conflict between
Miranda and Terry. In the aftermath of the Court's decision in Berkemer,
new developments led lower courts to expand the character of Terry stops
to a point where law enforcement could detain suspects in a manner
analogous to custodial arrests. Part I.D. I analyzes the consensus movement
among lower courts over the past twenty-five years to permit a broader
array of police tactics under Terry in order to maximize police safety and
deter a suspect's flight. Part I.D.2 discusses a more recent trend among
courts to side with local law enforcement in Fourth Amendment challenges
based on local law enforcement's new role in combating terrorism in the
post-9/1 1 era.
1. The Gradual Increase of Police Authority During Terry Stops Permitted
by Appellate Courts
The Supreme Court's early extensions of Terry in the 1970s and 1980s
sparked an even greater aggrandizement at the appellate level.219 Chief
Justice Warren's majority opinion in Terry had allowed courts to sanction
any police conduct that was reasonably related in scope to the impending
threat. 220 Beginning around the time of Berkemer, appellate courts seized
on this rationale to condone more intrusive police practices under Terry that
would help police officers more effectively investigate their suspicion
without converting the detention into an arrest.221 Justified in large part by
an officer's interest in ensuring his own protection and preventing a
suspect's flight during a Terry stop,222 most circuits today have approved
police use of drawn weapons or handcuffs to restrain criminal suspects. 223
219. See supra notes 172-87 and accompanying text.
220. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 20; supra note 146 and accompanying text.
221. See Godsey, supra note 21, at 728.
222. See Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 702 (1981); supra note 187 and
accompanying text.
223. See Dorsey v. Barber, 517 F.3d 389, 399 (6th Cir. 2008) ("During a Terry stop,
officers may draw their weapons or use handcuffs so long as circumstances warrant that
precaution." (quoting Radvansky v. City of Olmsted Falls, 395 F.3d 291, 309 (6th Cir.
2005)) (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also United States v. Thomas, 524 F.3d 855,
858 (8th Cir. 2008); United States v. Copening, 506 F.3d 1241, 1248 (10th Cir. 2007);
United States v. Elston, 479 F.3d 314, 320 (4th Cir. 2007); United States v. Fornia-Castillo,
408 F.3d 52, 64-65 (1st Cir. 2005); United States v. Vargas, 369 F.3d 98, 102 (2d Cir.
2004); United States v. Miles, 247 F.3d 1009, 1012-13 (9th Cir. 2001); United States v. Gil,
204 F.3d 1347, 1350-51 (11 th Cir. 2000) (per curiam).
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Courts have also permitted police to demand a suspect to lay prostrate on
the ground during a stop and frisk search.224 In addition, courts have
allowed police to forcibly transport suspects (most notably to a patrol car)
under a valid Terry stop. 225
As a result, lower courts, while maintaining that Terry remains a limited
exception, have authorized conduct similar to that associated with custodial
arrest without converting that stop into a full-fledged arrest.226 To be sure,
lower courts have not altered Terry's predicate threshold of reasonable
suspicion, as distinguished from traditional arrests that require probable
cause to act on suspects. Doing so would, of course, undermine the Terry
doctrine altogether.227 Instead, Terry remains a separate justification for
law enforcement to investigate criminal activity. Officers acting within
Terry's parameters need only a reasonable suspicion that criminal activity is
afoot.228 Faced with this lower degree of certainty about the suspect's
involvement, appellate courts have nonetheless deemed it appropriate to
equip police with more forceful measures to investigate, a trend that has
allowed law enforcement to more effectively combat criminal activity,
while exposing potential suspects to more intrusive interrogations in the
public domain. 229
2. Terry in a New Age: A Change in Judicial Mindset
The Supreme Court has yet to address the constitutionality of the new
police practices now condoned by appellate courts under Terry. However,
the Court's recent Terry jurisprudence suggests that the current Justices
have no plans to limit police authority under Terry. In fact, the Supreme
Court appears to be heading in quite the opposite direction.
In a recent Terry decision, the Court upheld the conviction of a defendant
who refused to provide a police officer with his name during a Terry stop in
accordance with a state identification statute, sanctioning for the first time
224. See United States v. Tilmon, 19 F.3d 1221, 1227-28 (7th Cir. 1994) ("When a
suspect is considered dangerous, requiring him to lie face down on the ground is the safest
way for police officers to approach him, handcuff him and finally determine whether he
carries any weapons."); see also United States v. Perdue, 8 F.3d 1455, 1462-63 (10th Cir.
1993); United States v. Taylor, 716 F.2d 701, 709 (9th Cir. 1983).
225. See United States v. Stewart, 388 F.3d 1079, 1084-85 (7th Cir. 2004); United States
v. Gori, 230 F.3d 44, 55-56 (2d Cir. 2000); Halvorsen v. Baird, 146 F.3d 680, 684 (9th Cir.
1998).
226. See Tilmon, 19 F.3d at 1224-25 (observing that, among appellate courts, "[flor better
or for worse, the trend has led to the permitting of the use of handcuffs, the placing of
suspects in police cruisers, the drawing of weapons and other measures of force more
traditionally associated with arrest than with investigatory detention").
227. See supra Part I.B.1.
228. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968).
229. See Estrada, supra note 21, at 279 ("Whereas a Terry stop was originally conceived
as a narrow exception to the requirement that all governmental seizures be accompanied by
probable cause-a nominally innocuous 'stop and frisk'-the Supreme Court and its lower-
court counterparts have since granted police officers broad arrest-like powers in executing a
Terry stop.").
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compelled speech in a stop and frisk setting. 230 Justice Anthony Kennedy's
majority opinion in Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial District Court justified the
Court's conclusion based on the limited intrusiveness associated with mere
identity requests. 231 A name's universal characteristic and the request's
routine nature, the Court reasoned, was not so intrusive that it exceeded the
bounds associated with a police officer's legitimate investigation of a
reasonable suspicion. 232
Noticeably absent in the Court's opinion, but at the forefront of the
debate in Hiibel, among other recent Terry cases, was the potential impact
of September 11, 2001, on the Terry doctrine and local law enforcement
authority. 233 The new political reality confronting America in the post-9/1 1
era has recalibrated the balance of interests between states and individuals
during ad hoc police encounters.234 While not garnering the same headlines
as the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) or Department of Homeland
Security, local law enforcement has become a vital component of the
govemment's effort to monitor terrorist activity within its borders. 235 Local
law enforcement's best asset to combat terrorist threats is its sheer numbers
and the ability to monitor daily activities using its basic civil authority as
public peacekeepers. 236 For example, in the weeks preceding the 9/11
230. Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Court, 542 U.S. 177, 185-86 (2004).
231. See id. at 188-89.
232. Id. at 186.
233. On the day that the Court delivered its holding in Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial District
Court, 542 U.S. 177, it was in the midst of completing an opinion in the first major challenge
to President George W. Bush's detention of enemy combatants. See generally Hamdi v.
Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004). The Court released its opinion in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld
exactly one week after deciding Hiibel.
234. See William J. Stuntz, Local Policing After the Terror, 111 YALE L.J. 2137, 2159
(2002) (noting that "judicial concern for the need to fight terrorism, applied to cases that may
have nothing to do with terrorism-is likely to produce legal change"); see also Robert
Chesney & Jack Goldsmith, Terrorism and the Convergence of Criminal and Military
Detention Models, 60 STAN. L. REv. 1079, 1120-22 (2008) (analyzing the "convergence" of
criminal and military detention models in the post-9/1 1 era). Robert Chesney and Jack
Goldsmith argue that "[t]he problem of modem terrorism demands anticipatory or predictive
forms of liability, and may demand a lower rate of erroneous acquittals than the traditional
criminal system would tolerate." Chesney & Goldsmith, supra, at 1120.
235. See David A. Harris, The War on Terror, Local Police, and Immigration
Enforcement: A Curious Tale of Police Power in Post-9/1l America, 38 RUTGERS L.J. 1, 10
(2006) (stating that "state and local police in virtually any city now participate in joint
terrorism task forces with their federal law enforcement counterparts in their jurisdictions").
As a result, "local police frequently find themselves guarding critical public infrastructure,
such as airports, bridges, tunnels, stadiums, and the like," and thus court rulings may now
influence an officer's ability to combat legitimate terrorist threats. Id. at 11; see also
Matthew C. Waxman, Police and National Security: American Local Law Enforcement and
Counter-Terrorism After 9/11, at 5 (Columbia Law Sch. Pub. Law & Legal Theory Working
Paper Group, Paper No. 08-191, 2008) (on file with the Fordham Law Review) ("[L]ocal
police agencies have played a number of counter-terrorism roles in recent years. Most
criminal prosecutions for crimes directly related to terrorism are investigated . . . at the
federal level. But local police agencies' efforts to prevent and deter crime . . . aim to
establish an environment inhospitable to terrorism-related activities." (footnotes omitted)).
236. See Harris, supra note 235, at 3-11; Waxman, supra note 235, at 7 ("It is natural that
local police agencies would be called upon to combat the terrorism threat. The public looks
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attacks, local police had stopped three of the eventual assailants during
routine motor vehicle stops,23 7 an authority that, as Berkemer recognized, is
analogous to a Terry stop. 238  Thus, the apparent need for local law
enforcement to act swiftly and to obtain vital information may very well
generate added pressure on courts to expand police authority during
impromptu encounters similar to stop and frisks. 239 From Terry's origins as
a necessary evil to combat race riots of the 1960s to its reformation during
the war on drugs, courts have often defined Terry stops within the context
of contemporaneous societal concerns. 240 In this new post-9/11 era, the
greater appreciation of the threat of terrorism will undoubtedly help further
define the scope of stop and frisks in the next generation. 24 1
Of course, one can only speculate as to the extent to which, if any, the
threat of terrorism influenced the Court's 5-4 outcome in Hiibel. One need
not stretch the imagination, however, to consider the benefits of mandatory
identification statutes on local law enforcement's ability to investigate the
background of suspicious individuals where terrorist warnings have been
issued.24 2 In its amicus brief to the Court in support of Nevada's statute,
first to local police for basic security. And the federal government [must rely on] their
assistance because local police agencies possess the massive manpower needed to sustain
these functions ... ").
237. See Laurel R. Boatright, Note, "Clear Eye for the State Guy": Clarifying Authority
and Trusting Federalism to Increase Nonfederal Assistance with Immigration Enforcement,
84 TEX. L. REV. 1633, 1646 (2006) (citing STEVEN A. CAMAROTA, CTR. FOR IMMIGRATION
STUDIES, THE OPEN DOOR: How MILITANT ISLAMIC TERRORISTS ENTERED AND REMAINED IN
THE UNITED STATES, 1993-2001, at 51 (2002), available at http://www.cis.org/articles
/2002/theopendoor.pdf).
238. Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 439 (1984).
239. See Estrada, supra note 2 1, at 312 ("That the traumatic events of September 11 th
would affect the balancing of governmental interests and privacy interests in evaluating the
validity of a Fourth Amendment claim is understandable and permissible."); Harris, supra
note 235, at 4 ("Given the risks and dangers involved in potential terrorism, it would shock
no one if courts gave greater power to all of law enforcement, including state and local
police. In fact, courts might find it difficult to do otherwise .... ); Stuntz, supra note 234,
at 2160 (suggesting that one way the government might ease local law enforcement
complaints about a lack of antiterrorism funding would be to reduce legal restrictions on
daily police activity). In response, William Stuntz argues that "[c]ourts are likely to respond
to that pressure in the same manner-by giving police more power." Stuntz, supra note 234,
at 2160.
240. See supra notes 155-60, 181 and accompanying text.
241. See generally Gerald G. Ashdown, The Blueing of America: The Bridge Between
the War on Drugs and the War on Terrorism, 67 U. PITT. L. REV. 753 (2006).
242. In his article on police participation in the war on terror, David A. Harris discusses
this issue in the context of a different Supreme Court decision, Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S.
405 (2005), in which the link between expanding local law enforcement powers and
terrorism requires "very little imagination" even though the context in which the case was
litigated, on the surface, shared little relation to terrorism. See Harris, supra note 235, at 9.
In Caballes, the Court found that the use of a drug-sniffing dog during a routine traffic stop
did not violate the defendant's Fourth Amendment rights since the encounter did not expose
noncontraband items and so did not infringe upon the defendant's legitimate expectation of
privacy. Caballes, 543 U.S. at 409. In dissent, Justice David Souter rejected the Court's
broad ruling, but also made clear that he was "concerned not to prejudge a claim of authority
to detect explosives and dangerous chemical or biological weapons that might be carried by
a terrorist who prompts no individualized suspicion." Id. at 417 n.7 (Souter, J., dissenting).
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the U.S. Department of Justice alluded to antiterrorism tools, such as the
maintenance of effective "watch-lists," as relying heavily on self-
identification statutes. 243 Hiibel's implication on post-9/1 I policy had also
been addressed by the Nevada Supreme Court, which, in ruling against the
defendant in Hiibel, noted in its opinion that "[t]errorism is 'changing the
way we live and the way we act and the way we think.' ' 244 And so "[t]o
deny officers the ability to request identification from suspicious persons
[under Terry] creates a situation where an officer could approach a wanted
terrorist or sniper but be unable to identify him."245 To convey its grave
concern for protecting local law enforcement powers, the Nevada Supreme
Court cited statements made by President George W. Bush and Senate
Majority Leader Tom Daschle discussing the gravity of the threat now
posed by terrorism to national security. 246
Indeed, the U.S. Supreme Court has already publicly recognized the
connection between local law enforcement and terrorist prevention. In its
very first Terry case argued following the 9/11 attacks, United States v.
Arvizu,247 Justice Sandra Day O'Connor acknowledged a sudden change in
judicial mindset regarding local law enforcement authority when she stated
in oral arguments that "[w]e live in a perhaps more ... dangerous age today
than we did when this event [argued before the Court] took place." 248
Justice O'Connor directed her concern at the lower court's framework
regarding police authority under Terry, which "seemed to be a little more
rigid than... common sense would dictate today." 249 In Arvizu, the Court
ultimately upheld the police conduct at issue.250
Hiibel remains a prominent example of how the Court's Fourth
Amendment attitudes may be evolving in light of local law enforcement's
new role in the post-9/1 1 era. In Hiibel, the Court abandoned a number of
its own previous statements that had rejected a defendant's duty to respond
to police inquiries under Terry.251 The relative ease with which the Court
243. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent at 14-15,
Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Court, 542 U.S. 177 (2004) (No. 03-5554), 2004 WL 121587;
see also Estrada, supra note 21, at 312.




247. 534 U.S. 266 (2002).
248. See Linda Greenhouse, Court Rules on Police Searches of Motorists, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 16, 2002, at A17 (adding that "[w]hen the case was argued... it was evident that recent
events [(9/11)] were on the minds of at least some justices").
249. Id.
250. See Arvizu, 534 U.S. at 277-78. The case involved a dispute over whether a border
patrol agent held a sufficient reasonable suspicion before searching a vehicle that ultimately
contained 100 pounds of marijuana. Id. at 270-72.
251. See Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Court of Nev., 542 U.S. 177, 197-99 (2004)
(Breyer, J., dissenting). As Justice Stephen Breyer noted in his dissent, past Court dicta had
repeatedly asserted that no obligation existed to answer police questions during a Terry stop.
Id.; see Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 34 (1968) (White, J., concurring) ("Of course, the person
stopped is not obliged to answer, answers may not be compelled, and refusal to answer
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pushed aside previous dicta suggests that 9/11 has altered the Court's (and
the nation's) understanding about the proper balance of interests during a
stop and frisk encounter.
It is also worth noting that the Court's decision in Hiibel raised a new
constitutional dimension: that of self-incriminating speech during a Terry
stop. 252 In his appeal to the Court, the defendant in Hiibel argued that the
identification statute violated his Fifth Amendment right against
compulsory self-incrimination. 253 Justice Kennedy's opinion rejected the
argument, noting that a name's general and routine characteristic rendered it
outside the Court's definition of self-incriminating evidence under the Fifth
Amendment. 254 However, the Court has yet to articulate a definite standard
with which to determine the scope of its own "routine inquiry" rationale
along with its relationship to a defendant's right against compulsory self-
incrimination. 255
II. CLASH OF THE TITANS: HOW THE COLLISION BETWEEN MIRANDA AND
TERRY HAS IGNITED A CIRCUIT SPLIT
For a multitude of reasons, courts have sanctioned more intrusive police
tactics under Terry that may be characterized as hallmarks of a custodial
arrest. As a consequence, appellate courts have been forced to revisit
Berkemer and the issue of whether certain Terry stops raise legitimate
Miranda concerns. This has led to a distinct circuit split among appellate
courts. Part II.A provides a basic summary of the current appellate conflict.
Part II.B introduces and explains one position taken by appellate courts:
that valid Terry stops, due to their inherent reasonableness and stature as
nonarrest detentions, should not trigger Miranda warnings. Part II.C
addresses the alternative approach: if Terry stops reach the physical
threshold commonly associated with custodial interrogation, then Miranda
should apply.
A. What's in a Name?: Providing Context to the Ongoing Constitutional
Tension
The sanction of more intrusive stop and frisks at the appellate level has
increasingly shifted the character of Terry stops closer to that of a
furnishes no basis for an arrest .... ); see also Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 439
(1984) ("[T]he officer may ask the detainee a moderate number of questions to determine his
identity .... But the detainee is not obliged to respond."); Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S.
352, 365 (1983) (Brennan, J., concurring) (stating that a Terry suspect "must be free to...
decline to answer the questions put to him").
252. See Estrada, supra note 21, at 298 ("Hiibel is all the more significant an expansion
of the Terry doctrine in that it parts company with the Court's earlier statements regarding
compelled speech during a Terry encounter.").
253. See Hiibel, 542 U.S. at 189.
254. Id. at 189-91; see Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S. 582, 596-601 (1990) (holding
that statements providing basic, routine information, such a suspect's name, are not
testimonial for purposes of Miranda).
255. See supra note 239 and accompanying text.
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traditional arrest.2 56 This trend has increasingly blurred the distinction
made in Dunaway between the limited character of Terry stops and
arrests. 257  Whereas Justice Marshall's characterization of Terry in
Berkemer described a brief, limited intrusion, 258 police conduct today raises
the important question of whether some highly intrusive Terry stops overlap
with custodial interrogation implicated by Miranda.
The problem is exacerbated by the fact that Berkemer's explanation of
Terry remains the principal authority upon which judges rely to explain the
intersection between Miranda and Terry. To be sure, Berkemer's limited
holding, to deny Miranda rights during a brief motor vehicle stop, has not
been undermined by subsequent policy or jurisprudence. However
Berkemer's dicta on Terry, dismissing Miranda's application in just about
all Terry interactions, has created a serious disconnect between the facts
currently associated with Terry stops and the doctrine applied by lower
courts.
259
Indeed, the current conflict is not rooted solely in the expansion of Terry,
but additionally in the failure among lower courts to recognize this change
and reflect as much within their jurisprudence. Courts confronting Terry
searches that involve handcuffs, drawn weapons, or relocation of suspects
continue to cite Justice Marshall's dicta indicating that Terry stops lack the
sort of coercive character that would require Miranda warnings. 260
Since Berkemer, the Supreme Court has not revisited the relationship
between Miranda rights and Terry stops. However, the Court's silence has
not been for a lack of discord at the federal appellate level. Over the past
fifteen years, appellate courts have struggled to articulate a uniform
standard. The First, Fourth, and Sixth Circuits have held that the
reasonableness of a Terry stop and frisk alone precludes the necessity of
Miranda considerations, even during intrusive Terry stops. 261 The Second,
Seventh, and Tenth Circuits have ruled that intrusive Terry stops can
require Miranda warnings before further interrogation can proceed,
256. See supra note 226.
257. Consider that the Supreme Court in Quarles deemed handcuffing and surrounding a
defendant to be custody under Miranda, while appellate courts now sanction the same
practice as part of a purportedly limited Terry stop. See supra notes 104-05, 223 and
accompanying text.
258. See supra notes 2 10-11 and accompanying text.
259. See supra notes 210-18 and accompanying text; see also United States v. Pelayo-
Ruelas, 345 F.3d 589, 592 (8th Cir. 2003) ("Citing Berkemer, we have declared that, 'No
[Miranda] warning is necessary for persons detained for a Terry stop.,' (citing United States
v. McGauley, 786 F.2d 888, 890 (8th Cir. 1986))); United States v. Swanson, 341 F.3d 524,
528 (6th Cir. 2003) ("The very nature of a Terry stop means that a detainee is not free to
leave during the investigation, yet is not entitled to Miranda rights." (citing Berkemer v.
McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 439-41 (1984))); United States v. Leshuk, 65 F.3d 1105, 1108 (4th
Cir. 1995) ("In Berkemer, the Supreme Court held that Miranda warnings are not required
when a person is questioned during a routine traffic stop or stop pursuant to Terry v. Ohio."
(citing Berkemer, 468 U.S. at 437-42)); supra note 18.
260. See supra note 259.
261. See Swanson, 341 F.3d at 528-29; United States v. Trueber, 238 F.3d 79, 95 (tst Cir.
2001); Leshuk, 65 F.3d at 1110.
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depending on the degree of constraint associated with the stop and frisk.262
Meanwhile, the Eighth and Ninth Circuits have each rendered inconsistent
rulings with respect to the issue. 263 The current schism among federal
appellate courts264 can be attributed in part to the discretion allowed by the
Supreme Court in Berkemer to consider challenges on a case-by-case
basis. 265 But more important, the expansion of Terry at the appellate level
and the continued application of the obsolete and misleading framework in
Berkemer have been the primary catalysts for the conflict.266 Moreover,
local law enforcement's new role in the war against terrorism highlights the
importance of resolving the conflict as soon as possible.
To simply label the current appellate discord as a "circuit split"
drastically understates the complexity underlying the conflict between
Miranda and Terry. To be sure, appellate courts have split on this issue.
However, where two colliding constitutional doctrines are involved, the
lack of unanimity among circuit courts reflects not only different views on
the proper outcome or formula to resolve the matter, but a more
fundamental problem: how Miranda and Terry can effectively coexist. 267
Courts today are struggling to understand the essential relationship between
Miranda and Terry, which in turn has produced a plethora of different
approaches. Some circuits have developed a Terry-heavy analysis while
others tend to emphasize Miranda's interests. 268 This result evinces the
sheer complexity involved when two robust constitutional doctrines,
originally projected on different courses, unexpectedly collide.
Resolving the connection between Miranda and Terry, two doctrines the
Warren Court established through balancing interests and shifting burdens,
262. See United States v. Newton, 369 F.3d 659, 668-75 (2d Cir. 2004); United States v.
Perdue, 8 F.3d 1455, 1465 (10th Cir. 1993); United States v. Smith, 3 F.3d 1088, 1096-99
(7th Cir. 1993).
263. Compare United States v. Martinez, 462 F.3d 903, 910 (8th Cir. 2006) (suppressing
defendant's statements during stop and frisk that involved handcuffs), and United States v.
Kim, 292 F.3d 969, 978 (9th Cir. 2002) (finding statements inadmissible during Terry stop
where defendant was locked in her own store by police during questioning), with United
States v. Davis, 530 F.3d 1069, 1082 (9th Cir. 2008) (admitting defendant's statements in
court after defendant was told he could not leave and was handcuffed), United States v.
Cervantes-Flores, 421 F.3d 825, 830 (9th Cir. 2005) (per curiam) (holding that statements
made by defendant while handcuffed were admissible), and Pelayo-Ruelas, 345 F.3d at 592-
93 (allowing statements made by defendant while surrounded by police to be heard in court).
264. Other courts and commentators have described the circuit split slightly differently.
They have placed the U.S. Courts of Appeals for the First, Fourth, and Eighth Circuits in
favor of the inherent reasonableness approach of Terry with the U.S. Courts of Appeals for
the Second, Seventh, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits considering the degree of intrusion involved
for Miranda purposes. See United States v. Artiles-Martin, No. 5:08-cr-14-Oc-10, 2008 WL
2600787, at * 11 n.39 (M.D. Fla. June 30, 2008); Katherine M. Swift, Comment, Drawing a
Line Between Terry and Miranda: The Degree and Duration of Restraint, 73 U. CI-. L. REV.
1075, 1075-76 (2006).
265. See supra notes 207-09 and accompanying text.
266. See supra Part I.D. 1-2.
267. See Swift, supra note 264, at 1076 (stating that the circuit split with respect to the
issue "illustrates a misunderstanding about how Terry and Miranda interact").
268. See infra Part II.B-C.
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cannot be accomplished simply through a basic inquiry into their respective
constitutional amendments. One might attempt to explain the relationship
between Miranda and Terry by the "intimate relation" between the Fourth
and Fifth Amendments.2 69 But the Supreme Court has gradually abandoned
the view that a symbiotic relationship exists between Fourth and Fifth
Amendment protections. 270
At the heart of the conflict between Miranda and Terry rests a struggle
among appellate courts to define and identify how the modem Terry stop
aligns with Miranda and its threshold of custodial interrogation. 27 1 A Terry
stop, by definition, is not an arrest. 272 Yet, its current character involves
techniques that are virtually identical to that of traditional arrests.273 Thus,
the ultimate question becomes whether a court should heed Terry's name or
substance when considering a Miranda challenge. It is this underlying
tension that has shaped the current split among appellate courts.
B. The Inherent Reasonableness Approach: Justifiable Terry Stops Should
Preclude the Need for Miranda Considerations
A number of appellate courts have constructed an approach that has
effectively diminished a defendant's ability to invoke Miranda during Terry
stops.274 This section details three appellate cases that espouse that view.
1. United States v. Leshuk
In United States v. Leshuk,275 the Fourth Circuit made clear that
"[i]nstead of being distinguished by the absence of any restriction of liberty,
Terry stops differ from custodial interrogation in that they must last no
longer than necessary to verify or dispel the officer's suspicion. '2 76 The
appropriate inference taken from the court's statement is that, so long as an
269. See Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 633 (1886); see also Schmerber v.
California, 384 U.S. 757, 767 (1966) ("The values protected by the Fourth Amendment thus
substantially overlap those the Fifth Amendment helps to protect."); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S.
643, 656-57 (1961) ("We find that.., the Fourth and Fifth Amendments... do enjoy an
'intimate relation' in their perpetuation of 'principles of humanity and civil liberty [secured]
only after years of struggle."' (footnote omitted) (quoting Bram v. United States 168 U.S.
532, 543-44 (1897))).
270. See Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 330-32 (1973) (denying Boyd's
applicability to the petitioner's case); Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 301-04 (1967)
(noting that Boyd's notion of a defendant's property rights as being self-incriminating during
police searches has been discredited).
271. See supra notes 84-87 and accompanying text.
272. See Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 211-16 (1979).
273. See supra notes 256-57 and accompanying text.
274. Altogether, five circuit courts have handed down opinions in favor of this approach,
including two courts that have also produced opinions that employ the opposing approach.
See supra notes 261, 263 and accompanying text.
275. 65 F.3d 1105 (4th Cir. 1995).
276. Id. at 1109.
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officer remains within the bounds of Terry, his actions cannot be viewed as
custodial interrogation for purposes of Miranda.277
In Leshuk, two policemen cornered a defendant in the woods whom they
suspected was involved in marijuana cultivation. 278 Aided by a companion,
the officers forced the defendant to raise his hands in the air, and warned
that if the defendant did not call off his operations, the police would shoot
his dog.279 Following the threat, the officers surrounded the defendant in
the woods and proceeded to ask questions about his activity. 280  No
Miranda rights were read at any point during the discussion.2 81 After the
defendant was indicted, the magistrate judge recommended the suppression
of any statements made by the defendant during his conversation with
police. 282 The district court rejected the recommendation, and the appellate
court affirmed its decision.283
The Fourth Circuit's analysis relied heavily on Berkemer's
characterization of Terry stops as being limited in nature and possessing a
nonintrusive quality.284 The court explained that the temporal brevity of the
search, lasting no longer than to dispel a suspicion, marked a crucial
distinction between Terry stops and those instances targeted by Miranda.285
Furthermore, the necessity for police to carry out their investigatory
detention, the Fourth Circuit reasoned, justified the use of more intrusive
force (such as handcuffs and drawn weapons), but the court found that "to
use force does not necessarily elevate a lawful stop into a custodial arrest
for Miranda purposes." 286
The Fourth Circuit likewise adopted a narrow view of Miranda and
dismissed its application in situations lacking an official arrest. 287 This can
be explained in part by the court's reliance on the Supreme Court's decision
in Beheler, which had appeared to limit Miranda warnings to detentions
that involved custodial arrest.288  According to the Fourth Circuit's
frame~vork, Beheler's focus on custodial arrest prevented any potential
overlap between Miranda and Terry because Terry, by definition, provided
an exception to traditional arrest authority for police. 289  The court
277. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit endorsed the same proposition. See
United States v. Swanson, 341 F.3d 524, 528 (6th Cir. 2003).




282. Id. at 1108.
283. Id. at 1108, 1110.
284. Id. at 1110.
285. Id. at 1109.
286. Id. at 1110.
287. Id. at 1108.
288. See supra notes 85-86 and accompanying text.
289. See Godsey, supra note 21, at 736 ("It could be argued that this language [in
Beheler] connects Miranda to the Fourth Amendment and sets forth an analytical structure
where Miranda is not triggered until an encounter leaves the Terry realm and becomes a full-
scale Fourth Amendment arrest.").
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concluded that a restraint on the defendant's freedom could only rise to the
level worthy of Miranda, therefore, if police acted along the lines of a
traditional arrest.290 As a result, the handcuffing of the suspect during a
Terry stop, though involving conduct associated with a traditional arrest,
still did not necessarily constitute custodial interrogation. 291  Thus, the
Fourth Circuit's strict adherence to Beheler dismissed the possibility of any
prearrest Miranda claims, including a valid Terry stop. 292
The Fourth Circuit's framework produces a police-friendly approach,
allowing law enforcement to detain suspects for a longer period without
enhancing the possibility that a suspect will be deterred from cooperating
after Miranda warnings.293 It also provides a bright-line rule that excuses
police officers from the burden of complicated caveats and legal exceptions
that may create hazardous consequences when police must act according to
their instincts. 294
2. United States v. Trueber
Other circuit courts confronted with parallel fact patterns have developed
a similar framework. In United States v. Trueber,295 the First Circuit
rejected a defendant's Miranda challenge during a Terry stop in which the
police drew their weapons and forced him to place his hands over his
head.296 The Boston police initially stopped the defendant's car based on a
suspicion of cocaine dealing.297  During the encounter, several police
officers surrounded both the defendant and his companion with their guns
drawn.298 The police asked the defendant several questions about his
identity and his reasons for visiting Boston.299
Having yet to notify the defendant of his Miranda rights, the police
officers asked the defendant for permission to inspect his hotel room, to
which the defendant consented. 300 Once at the hotel, more agents arrived at
the scene, and the officers sat the defendant down in the middle of the hotel
290. Leshuk, 65 F.3d at 1109 ("[T]he perception .. that one is not free to leave is
insufficient to convert a Terry stop into an arrest. A brief but complete restriction of liberty
is valid under Terry [without requiring Miranda warnings]." (second alteration in original)
(quoting United States v. Moore, 817 F.2d 1105, 1108 (4th Cir. 1987)) (internal quotation
marks omitted)).
291. See supra note 286 and accompanying text.
292. See supra note 286 and accompanying text; see also Swift, supra note 264, at 1079.
293. See Godsey, supra note 21, at 736.
294. The Supreme Court has sometimes advocated the need for clear rules for police to
follow when their duties require extemporaneous, ad hoc decisions outside the police station.
See, e.g., United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 234-35 (1973) (creating a bright-line rule
that granted police authority to search a person under custodial arrest after he was pulled
over on the street for driving with an expired car license).
295. 238 F.3d 79 (1st Cir. 2001).
296. See id. at 83, 94-95.
297. Id. at 82-83.
298. Id. at 83.
299. Id.
300. Id. at 84.
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room, where they proceeded to ask the defendant additional questions,
including the nature of his visit, his relationship to his companion, and the
articles in his possession at that moment. 301 The officers notified the
defendant that he was not under arrest.30 2 During the interrogation, the
defendant made several inconsistent statements about the nature of his
business in Boston.303 He also confirmed his relationship with a different
suspect whom the police had recently arrested. 30 4  These statements
provided police with sufficient evidence to formally arrest the defendant
with probable cause. 30 5 The entire encounter lasted approximately two
hours.306
In its analysis, the First Circuit rejected the defendant's argument that the
police detention had constituted custodial interrogation worthy of Miranda
warnings. 307  The court alluded to Berkemer and Justice Marshall's
statements about the nonthreatening character of Terry stops, rendering
them too limited for Miranda treatment. 30 8 The court posited that Terry's
recent expansion did not undermine Berkemer's authority on such stops. 30 9
It reasoned that, since "[n]othing in the initial stop and detention exceeded
the bounds of an ordinary, permissible Terry stop," the facts did not justify
Miranda considerations. 310 Once again, Terry's inherent time limit-that
police may only detain a suspect to investigate their suspicion-led the
court to distinguish that stop from a traditional custodial arrest, where a
suspect may remain at the complete mercy of law enforcement for an
indefinite period of time.311
Like the Fourth Circuit in Leshuk,312 the Trueber court viewed Miranda
as being inapplicable to detentions lacking a definitive arrest. It assumed
that Terry searches, so long as they fell short of an arrest (as Dunaway
prohibited), 313 did not justify Miranda warnings. The court's approach
likewise placed added value on the state's interest under Terry to
investigate suspects without deterring suspect cooperation.
301. Id. at 85.
302. Id.
303. Id. at 84.
304. Id. at 85.
305. Id.
306. Id. at 82-86. This is a rough estimate based on the First Circuit's summary of the
events.
307. Id. at 95.
308. Id. at 92.
309. Id. at 94 (noting that, since drawn weapons are an acceptable procedure during Terry
stops, and the conduct "was reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified
stopping the truck in the first place," the police conduct did not exceed its permitted
boundaries and so did not convert the stop and frisk into a de facto arrest).
310. Id. at 93.
311. Id. at 93-95.
312. See supra notes 287-92 and accompanying text.
313. See Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 213-14 (1979).
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3. United States v. Cervantes-Flores
In another example, the Ninth Circuit in United States v. Cervantes-
Flores314 considered a defendant's appeal to exclude statements made after
he was handcuffed and interrogated by a border patrol agent without having
been first read Miranda warnings. 315 The defendant in Cervantes-Flores
was a Mexican citizen whom U.S. officials had previously caught on
American soil without proper documentation. 316 A week later, officials
again spotted the defendant across the border, chased him down, handcuffed
him, and demanded the same documentation. 317 During the detention, the
defendant admitted that he was on U.S. soil illegally.318 The Ninth Circuit
denied the defendant's Fifth Amendment claim, ruling that a proper Terry
stop precluded the need for Miranda considerations. 319 The court was
silent on whether the police conduct subjected the defendant to custodial
interrogation according to Miranda or, more recently, Keohane.320 Instead
the Ninth Circuit limited its judicial inquiry to whether handcuffing was
beyond the reach of Terry.321 Because valid stop and frisks could include
the use of handcuffs, the court refused to consider the defendant's claim
that he was subject to custodial interrogation. 322 Similar to the Fourth and
First Circuits, the Ninth Circuit limited Miranda's applicability to situations
involving an unequivocal custodial arrest, ignoring the possibility that
conduct under a valid Terry stop might elevate to that threshold.323 The
opinion concluded that, because "handcuffing ... did not convert the Terry
stop into a custodial arrest," the lower court "did not err in admitting the
statements [the defendant] made. 324
One noticeable trend among courts applying the inherent reasonableness
approach is their lack of differentiation between Terry stops initiated by a
suspicion of immediate danger and those involving mere drug
trafficking. 325 The courts' Terry analyses focused solely on the degree of
restraint, not on the purpose of the stop. Of course, this outcome is by no
means surprising. The Supreme Court has repeatedly blurred the distinction
between immediate danger and other illegal activity, accepting each as
perfectly legitimate under Terry.326
314. 421 F.3d 825 (9th Cir. 2005) (per curiam).




319. Id. at 829-30.
320. Id.; see supra note 119 and accompanying text.
321. Cervantes-Flores, 421 F.3d at 829-30.
322. Id. at 830.
323. Id.
324. Id.
325. No court that espoused the inherent reasonableness approach in this part faced
factual circumstances containing a plausible public safety concern.
326. See supra notes 173-83 and accompanying text.
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C. The Intrusive Level Approach: Terry Stops Should Require Miranda
Warnings If They Qualify as Custodial Interrogation
Those courts that have found Miranda violations during a stop and frisk
encounter underscore that Terry's recent expansion has created an overlap
between the two doctrines. 327 This section discusses three circuit courts
that have, in their own unique fashion, asserted that Miranda does apply to
Terry stops. While the first two cases provide a straightforward Miranda
analysis to the facts of a Terry stop, the final case, from the Second Circuit,
provides a more nuanced and comprehensive version of the intrusive level
approach that ultimately forms the basis of this Note's proposed approach.
1. United States v. Perdue
In 1993, the Tenth Circuit observed in United States v. Perdue328 that,
while Berkemer envisioned Terry as allowing a limited, brief stop, the post-
Berkemer era "has witnessed a multifaceted expansion of Terry."329  In
Perdue, police officers stopped a defendant based on a reasonable suspicion
that he possessed several weapons as part of a drug operation. 330 The
police officers drew their weapons against the defendant, forced him to lay
face down on the ground, handcuffed him, and initiated questioning about
the defendant's drug operation, all without first informing the defendant of
his Miranda rights.331 The court in Perdue accepted the police tactics as
lawful under Terry,332 but it nonetheless found that, "by employing an
amount of force that reached the boundary line between a permissible Terry
stop and an unconstitutional arrest, the officers created the 'custodial'
situation envisioned by Miranda and its progeny." 333 The Tenth Circuit's
conclusion that Miranda applied was based solely on the physical restraints
associated with the Terry stop. 334 The court made no inquiry into the
circumstances surrounding the Terry search or the nature of the police's
suspicion that triggered the stop in the first place. As for determining
whether the police questioning constituted "interrogation," the court's
reliance on the Supreme Court standard in Innis effectively conceded the
327. See United States v. Newton, 369 F.3d 659, 673 (2d Cir. 2004) ("[I]nstead of asking
whether the degree of restraint was reasonable [under Terry], we have focused on 'whether a
reasonable person in defendant's position would have understood himself to be subjected to
the restraints comparable to those associated with a formal arrest." (quoting United States v.
Ali, 68 F.3d 1468, 1472 (2d Cir. 1995))). Altogether, five circuit courts have handed down
opinions in favor of this approach, including two courts that have also produced opinions
that employ the opposing approach. See supra notes 262-63 and accompanying text.
328. 8 F.3d 1455 (10th Cir. 1993).
329. Id. at 1464.
330. Id. at 1458.
331. Id. at 1458-59.
332. Id. at 1462 ("It was not unreasonable under the circumstances for the officers to
execute the Terry stop with their weapons drawn. While Terry stops generally must be fairly
nonintrusive, officers may take necessary steps to protect themselves if the circumstances
reasonably warrant such measures.").
333. Id. at 1464.
334. Id. at 1464-66.
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point to the defendant. 335 Indeed, virtually any question generated during a
stop and frisk would likely elicit an incriminating response given the
officer's need to dispel a suspicion that criminal activity is afoot.336
In light of the identified overlap between Miranda and Terry, the Tenth
Circuit entertained two separate inquiries. First, the court asked, as a
threshold matter, whether the police action constituted a valid Terry stop. 337
Since most courts concede that Terry authority extends to a much broader
set of circumstances today than it did in Berkemer, this element of the
inquiry would typically be satisfied.338 However, if the court found that the
police activity exceeded Terry's limit and converted the stop into a de facto
arrest, then any evidence obtained as a result would be inadmissible
according to the Fourth Amendment. 339
Once the court determined the Terry stop to be valid, it then posed the
additional and more important question of whether the stop subjected the
defendant to custodial interrogation and Miranda.340  If so, then any
statements made by the defendant before notified of his Miranda rights
would be inadmissible. 341 Whereas the inherent reasonableness approach's
focus on Terry derives from that court's assumption that legitimate stop and
frisks will never constitute custodial arrest, this alternative approach
underscores the language in Berkemer that kept alive the possibility that
some Terry stops may escalate to custodial interrogation. 342
According to the intrusive level approach, the Miranda violation would
not exclude any proper physical evidence obtained through the valid Terry
stop. For example, if a police officer discovered drugs through a valid stop
and frisk, but then subsequently neglected to read a defendant his Miranda
rights when appropriate, the drug evidence would still be admissible at
trial.343 Thus, the only way for defendants to argue for exclusion of
335. Id. at 1465; see also Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 300-01 (1980).
336. See supra notes 88-96 and accompanying text.
337. See Perdue, 8 F.3d at 1461-63. Of course, under the inherent reasonableness
approach, this would be the sole inquiry. See, e.g., supra note 319 and accompanying text,
For the intrusive level approach, conversely, judging the legitimacy of the Terry stop is
merely a precondition to the main question. See, e.g., infra notes 340-42 and accompanying
text.
338. See Perdue, 8 F.3d at 1461-63.
339. See Hayes v. Florida, 470 U.S. 811, 814-15 (1985) (ruling that bringing a suspect to
the police station for fingerprinting cannot be justified based on the Terry exception);
Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 213-14 (1979).
340. See Perdue, 8 F.3d at 1463-66.
341. See id.
342. See United States v. Smith, 3 F.3d 1088, 1097 (7th Cir. 1993) ("Berkemer thus
underscores that Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights are implicated before a defendant has
been arrested.").
343. No appellate court that has applied the intrusive level approach has prevented police
from gathering physical evidence during the stop and frisk encounter under the Fourth
Amendment. See generally United States v. Martinez, 462 F.3d 903 (8th Cir. 2006); United
States v. Newton, 369 F.3d 659 (2d Cir. 2004); United States v. Kim, 292 F.3d 969 (9th Cir.
2002); Perdue, 8 F.3d 1455; Smith, 3 F.3d 1088; see also supra note 337. The exclusion of




physical evidence in this context would be to challenge the Terry stop's
legitimacy in the first place, which is purely a Fourth Amendment
inquiry.344 The intrusive level approach's primary focus, conversely, is
exclusion of statements based on the Fifth Amendment. 345 Even physical
evidence obtained by police as a direct result of a Miranda violation need
not be suppressed. 346 Thus, oral statements constitute the only evidence
that hangs in the balance during a Miranda challenge to a Terry stop.
Courts that espouse the intrusive level approach, like the Tenth Circuit,
focus less on the societal interests and objectives associated with Terry.
They heed the familiar adage that constitutional guarantees should not be
abridged due to mere inconvenience or societal costs emanating from their
enforcement. 347 The main inquiry remains the extent to which the stop and
frisk curbs a defendant's freedom, an inquiry that relies on a pure factual
determination of whether the defendant's detention qualified as custodial
interrogation according to Miranda and its progeny. 348 This feature marks
an important distinction between the two approaches. While the gravamen
of the inherent reasonableness approach centers upon the applicability of
Terry, the alternative approach concentrates on Miranda's application to the
given circumstances. Underlying this distinction rests a debate over whose
interest, the state's or the individual's, should prevail at the collision point
between the two doctrines. Perdue's emphasis on Miranda demonstrates
that court's inclination to value a defendant's right against self-
incrimination as overriding a state's interest in investigating and
prosecuting criminals. 349 In fact, the Tenth Circuit in Perdue neglected to
mention any potential societal interests that might lend support to an
officer's delay of Miranda warnings during the defendant's custodial
interrogation. 350
344. See Perdue, 8 F.3d at 1461-63.
345. Defendants typically assert both claims. They first challenge the physical evidence
obtained by the Terry stop according to the Fourth Amendment and also statements made
during the Terry stop based on the Fifth Amendment and Miranda. See, e.g., Martinez, 462
F.3d at 906-07; Newton, 369 F.3d at 662.
346. See United States v. Patane, 542 U.S. 630, 634 (2004) (holding that physical fruits of
a Miranda violation need not be excluded).
347. See, e.g., Davis v. Washington, 126 S. Ct. 2266, 2280 (2006) ("We may not,
however, vitiate constitutional guarantees when they have the effect of allowing the guilty to
go free.").
348. See, e.g., United States v. Ali, 68 F.3d 1468, 1473 (2d Cir. 1995) (holding that
"whether the 'stop' was permissible under Terry v. Ohio... is irrelevant to the Miranda
analysis").
349. See, e.g., United States v. Smith, 3 F.3d 1088, 1097 (7th Cir. 1993) (emphasizing
that "[t]he purpose of the Miranda rule ... is not to protect the police or the public"). The
Seventh Circuit in Smith reasoned that "[p]olice officers have much less discretion than in
[pure] Fourth Amendment cases" since Miranda's sole function is to protect suspects from
coercive police interrogations. Id.
350. United States v. Perdue, 8 F.3d 1455, 1463-66 (10th Cir. 1993).
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2. United States v. Martinez
The debate on balancing societal interests was most evident in the Eighth
Circuit's opinion in United States v. Martinez,351 the facts of which were
presented at the beginning of this Note.35 2 In Martinez, the police were
searching for potential suspects in connection with a reported bank
robbery. 353 During the search, one officer noticed an individual that shared
similar, but not exact, characteristics with the bank's description of the
culprit.354 Lacking probable cause, the police officer stopped the defendant
and handcuffed him before conducting a stop and frisk.355 During the
officer's subsequent questioning of the suspect, the defendant made
inconsistent statements regarding the money in his possession.356 It was at
this point that the police officer read the defendant his Miranda rights,
placed the defendant in his police vehicle, and drove to the bank for
verification. 357
The Eighth Circuit accepted the police stop as valid under Terry, but
found that the defendant's statements while handcuffed were inadmissible
because they were made while the police subjected him to custodial
interrogation without first reciting Miranda warnings. 358 The analysis
provided a straightforward application of Miranda to the police detention,
with little mention of the police officer's duty to investigate the defendant's
potential involvement in a bank robbery.359 The court made clear that the
defendant "was entitled to Miranda warnings at the time he was
handcuffed," even though the police had not yet determined the identity of
the bank robber or potential accomplices. 360 In other words, the Eighth
Circuit focused purely on the detention's physical restraint of the suspect,
attaching little significance to the stop's duration or purpose.
The dissent in Martinez agreed with the majority that the use of
handcuffs imposed an additional, if not highly intrusive, layer of physical
restraint on the defendant. 361 However, it maintained that the interests
underlying the police conduct justified the officer's delay of Miranda
warnings.362 The dissent argued that "the critical fact for Miranda purposes
is that the questions were entirely consistent with the proper scope and
purpose of a reasonable Terry stop." 363  Though the custody at issue
strongly resembled an arrest, the dissent believed it could be justified as "an
351. 462 F.3d 903 (8th Cir. 2006).
352. See id. at 906-07; see also supra notes 1-9 and accompanying text.
353. Martinez, 462 F.3d at 906.
354. Id.
355. Id. at 906-07.
356, Id. at 906.
357. Id.
358. Id. at 909-10.
359. Id. at 908-10.
360. Id. at 910.
361. Id. at 911-13 (Loken, C.J., dissenting).
362. Id. at 912-13.
363. Id. at 912.
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action reasonably limited to officer safety concerns or the risk of flight
while the officers attempt to quickly confirm or dispel their suspicions. ' '364
In other words, the dissent claimed, the majority's straightforward inquiry
into whether the Terry stop imposed physical constraints associated with
custodial interrogation, without considering the societal interests at stake or
the stop's duration, ignored the basic justification for invoking Terry in the
first place. The majority, nonetheless, voted to exclude the evidence based
on Miranda.365
3. United States v. Newton
In contrast to the inherent reasonableness approach, which inquires solely
into the legitimacy of the Terry stop, applying Miranda to the facts of a
legitimate Terry stop may distinguish situations that involve immediate
danger and those stop and frisks investigating criminal activity but lacking
any threat of violence or harm.366 The Second Circuit in United States v.
Newton367 identified that the Quarles public safety exception to Miranda
still applies during a Terry stop. 368 Touching on the relationship between
the Quarles exception to Miranda and Terry, the Second Circuit established
that Miranda's application during Terry stops may depend largely on the
nature of criminal activity involved, and the extent to which personal safety
is at risk during the encounter.
In Newton, the defendant was seized by six law enforcement officials as
part of a Terry stop.369 He was handcuffed and questioned in his apartment
following word that he had threatened to kill his mother while in possession
of a gun.370  The Second Circuit concluded that the police conduct
subjected the defendant to custodial interrogation.371 The court explained,
"[h]andcuffs are generally recognized as a hallmark of a formal arrest. 372
Furthermore, "a reasonable person finding himself placed in handcuffs by
the police would ordinarily conclude that his detention would not
necessarily be temporary or brief," thus rendering ineffective the
government's contention that, since valid Terry stops can only exist in a
temporary fashion, they cannot pierce the threshold of custodial
interrogation. 373
364. Id. at 913.
365. Id. at 910 (majority opinion). While the majority found that the defendant's
statements should have been excluded, it nonetheless upheld his conviction based on its
assessment that the failure to exclude such evidence was ultimately a harmless error. Id.
366. The Quarles exception to Miranda establishes this very distinction. See supra notes
97-111 and accompanying text.
367. 369 F.3d 659 (2d Cir. 2004).
368. See id. at 667-74.
369. Id. at 663.
370. Id.
371. Id. at 676-77.




Yet, while the court deemed the suspect in custody for purposes of
Miranda, Judge Reena Raggi's unanimous opinion did not find a Miranda
violation since the officers' interrogation was limited to the preservation of
public safety.374 Judge Raggi's opinion found that the Terry stop's purpose
to prevent immediate harm to others, considering the defendant's
possession of a gun, justified the stop's interrogation and subsequent
procurement of self-incriminating evidence within a coercive setting.375
The court did concede that the defendant, once handcuffed, did not pose an
immediate threat. 376 But, citing Quarles, the court noted that "the presence
of three persons in the apartment in addition to Newton, the reported
hostility among these individuals, and the possibility that such hostility
could turn against law enforcement officers" together warranted a sufficient
concern among the officers that there remained a potential threat of public
safety. 377 Though the defendant was subject to custodial interrogation, the
police conduct did not have an eye toward securing a conviction. Instead
the interrogation was deemed necessary to prevent serious harm, falling
squarely within the parameters of Quarles.378
Finally, the court in Newton addressed how broad police questioning may
extend according to the Quarles exception during a Terry stop. If, for
instance, police had asked the defendant whether he had recently eaten
breakfast, the question would not have been tailored to the specific public
safety issue for which the Court would temporarily waive Miranda's
exclusionary power. In Newton, the defendant argued that police questions
related to "contraband" were broader than the immediate danger (the gun)
at issue, and, thus, his responses should have been inadmissible according
to Miranda.379 The Second Circuit rejected this view, noting, "Courts
recognize that public safety questions are framed spontaneously in
dangerous situations. Precision crafting cannot be expected in such
circumstances. '380 While the officer's "inquiry about 'contraband' did not
specifically refer to firearms, the term plainly encompassed such items.' '381
Conversely, had the officer's questions traversed beyond the scope of the
Terry stop's purpose to preserve public safety, subsequent responses would
likely have been excluded at trial.
374. Id. at 677. The court found that information pointing to the existence of weapons in
the apartment and previous threats of violence justified the existence of a public safety
concern during the Terry stop. Id. at 677-79.
375. Id. at 675.
376. Id. at 678.
377. Id. (citing Quarles v. New York, 467 U.S. 649, 657 (1984); United States v. Reyes,
353 F.3d 148, 153 (2d Cir. 2003)).
378. Id. at 677.
379. Id. at 678.
380. Id.
381. Id. at 679.
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III. LOCATING THE MIDDLE GROUND: A SOLUTION WHERE MIRANDA AND
TERRY CAN EFFECTIVELY COEXIST
This part seeks to provide a comprehensive solution to the current
conflict. Part II of this Note described the two competing approaches
adopted by courts to reconcile Miranda and Terry. While some appellate
courts posit that Terry's focus on simply reasonable police conduct, along
with its technical status as a nonarrest detention, precludes Miranda's
application, other courts contend that Miranda's custodial interrogation
standard should extend to Terry stops. Part III.A provides a brief analysis
of the two existing judicial approaches to the conflict, along with a brief
critique of proposed academic solutions. Part III.B outlines this Note's
proposal that Miranda should apply where custodial interrogation arises
from a legitimate Terry stop. However, where a Terry stop's detention
involves legitimate public safety concerns, courts should not hesitate to
delay Miranda's application until law enforcement can resolve the
immediate exigency. Finally, Part III.C applies this Note's approach to the
cases discussed in Part II.
A. Analyzing Current Approaches to the Conflict
The two approaches currently applied by courts emphasize either Terry
or Miranda to the other's detriment and fail to take into account the
competing interests at the heart of the conflict. The inherent reasonableness
analysis all too methodically overlooks a defendant's constitutionally
protected rights and excludes inquiry into the nature of the Terry stop.382 It
ignores the new relationship between Miranda and Terry in favor of a
simple and convenient bright-line approach. 383 In doing so, it finds shelter
in the semantic distinction between a Terry stop and arrest, oblivious to the
substantive overlap that courts and commentators have long since
recognized. 384
The inherent reasonableness approach is based principally on a circular
argument, one that provides a distorted rationale for the conclusion that
Miranda and Terry are mutually exclusive. The argument operates as
follows: so long as a court deems a Terry stop to be valid, the police action,
according to Dunaway, should not be deemed an arrest. Meanwhile, strict
reliance on Beheler limits Miranda only to those detentions that involve
custodial arrest.385 Thus, according to a court's interpretation of Beheler, a
valid Terry stop will never require Miranda warnings. 386
This specious rationale has emanated from a failure among courts to
acknowledge the evolution of their own Terry jurisprudence. Through strict
382. See supra notes 284-92, 325-26 and accompanying text.
383. See supra notes 293-94 and accompanying text.
384. See supra Part II.C; supra note 226; see also Godsey, supra note 21, at 716.
385. See supra notes 85-86, 288-89 and accompanying text.
386. The Fourth Circuit in Leshuk is a prominent example of how this circular reasoning
operates. See supra notes 276-94 and accompanying text.
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application of Dunaway and Berkemer, these courts continue to apply
outdated Terry analyses to present-day circumstances. 387  Indeed, by
emphasizing previous Supreme Court dicta that downplays Terry's invasive
character, while at the same time sanctioning contemporary Terry measures
that create far more intrusive custodies, these courts have enjoyed the
unwarranted luxury of having their cake and eating it too.
Ultimately, this approach fails to recognize that Miranda's primary
concern is not defining the parameters of an arrest, but rather, determining
whether a suspect is subjected to inherently coercive interrogation. Though
an arrest's physical restraints have been recognized as the appropriate
barometer to determine whether custodial interrogation exists, Miranda
does not depend on all elements of an arrest being present. 388 For instance,
Miranda's custody inquiry does not hinge on whether an officer has acted
with probable cause-an essential feature to an arrest.389 That factor is
ultimately irrelevant when deciding if a suspect was subject to a degree of
restraint that rendered him at the mercy of police.
Meanwhile, the intrusive level approach is correct to recognize the
overlap between Miranda and Terry; however, it too often overlooks
compelling police concerns regarding public safety and investigating
ongoing crimes. Indeed, this condition might arise frequently given the
Terry doctrine's very purpose of addressing ad hoc suspicions, in which
officers must often care for their own safety without the luxury of
assistance or systematic planning. 390  The approach applies a
straightforward Miranda test to Terry stops without considering how each
doctrine's interests interact. While Miranda was meant to protect criminal
suspects from coercive interrogations, it did not consider the kinds of
exigent circumstances during a police detention that might require
immediate police action as Terry recognized. 391 Only Newton recognized
this interplay, which distinguishes the Second Circuit's reliance on Quarles
from other court variations of the intrusive level approach. 392 By strictly
applying Miranda's custodial interrogation standard to Terry, most
applications of the intrusive level approach consider only the factual
circumstances of Terry stops while largely ignoring their justifications. 393
Judicial commentators who have proposed solutions to the existing
circuit split have developed a variety of frameworks, yet they share the
similar trait of wanting to avoid overlap between Miranda and Terry. This
may be achieved by embracing the inherent reasonableness approach, where
387. See supra notes 256-60 and accompanying text. Only in Quarles did the Supreme
Court consider scenarios involving exigent circumstances. See supra notes 97-111 and
accompanying text.
388. See supra note 85.
389. See supra note 85.
390. See supra notes 352-60 and accompanying text.
391. See supra Part I.A. 1, B. 1.
392. See supra Part I.C.
393. See generally United States v. Martinez, 462 F.3d 903 (8th Cir. 2006); United States
v. Perdue, 8 F.3d 1455 (10th Cir. 1993).
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valid Terry stops never trigger Miranda rights. 394 Another approach, more
sympathetic to defendants, has suggested that courts roll back the current,
expansive Terry doctrine to its original composition in order to avoid
conflict with custodial interrogation. 395 Though coherent in theory, this
approach fails to consider the degree to which courts have accepted and
embraced Terry's modem form. 396
Finally, one recent proposal has suggested that courts should apply a
sliding scale between a Terry stop's degree of restraint and duration to
determine whether Terry exceeds its bounds and thus requires Miranda
warnings. 397 The advocate of this proposal notes that this proposed
approach "highlights the fact that a stop cannot be both valid under Terry
and custodial under Miranda.'398 In other words, if a stop involves highly
intrusive techniques, the stop would require less duration before it exceeded
Terry and, as a consequence, require Miranda rights. Similarly a longer
detention would require less intrusive techniques to violate Terry and
invoke Miranda.399  Though these academic proposals provide very
different solutions to the current conflict, they all agree that Miranda cannot
effectively operate within the confines of a valid Terry stop.
B. Proposing a Two-Part Inquiry
This Note's proposed approach contends that Miranda and Terry can and
should operate together within a unified framework, so long as courts can
achieve the appropriate balance between the basic societal interests inherent
in each doctrine.400 Judging the degree of restraint should be one factor
(albeit a major one) in a larger inquiry that allows all elements, both
physical conditions and policy justifications, to be carefully addressed and
considered. To achieve that end, this Note proposes a two-part inquiry,
consistent with the Second Circuit's opinion in Newton, to decide whether
Miranda should apply during a Terry encounter.
First, in light of the totality of circumstances involved, a court should ask
whether the police detention and interrogation of a suspect under Terry
entails a degree of restraint associated with Miranda's basic custodial
standard as outlined most recently by the Supreme Court in Keohane.40 1 In
394. See Note, Custodial Engineering: Cleaning Up the Scope of Miranda Custody
During Coercive Terry Stops, 108 HARV. L. REv. 665, 682 (1995) (concluding that "the
Terry inquiry remains a sensible exception to the Miranda requirement").
395. See Godsey, supra note 21, at 746-47.
396. See supra Part I.D.1-2.
397. See Swift, supra note 264, at 1076.
398. Id.
399. Id. at 1076-77.
400. The key advantage for allowing Miranda and Terry to apply simultaneously is that it
permits courts to preserve the admissibility of evidence against Fourth Amendment
challenges while subjecting a defendant's statements to legitimate Fifth Amendment
concerns during custodial interrogation.




other words, a court should "consider the circumstances surrounding the
interrogation and then determine whether a reasonable person would have
felt at liberty to leave. ' 40 2 Though not an arrest in name, applying Miranda
rights to Terry conduct that rivals an arrest in its degree of physical restraint
also satisfies Beheler's requirement that custody for Miranda, at minimum,
involve a restriction of the "'freedom of movement' of the degree
associated with formal arrest." 40 3
According to Keohane and Beheler, police who surround a suspect with
guns drawn, or place him in handcuffs before questioning, though not
exceeding the limits of a valid Terry stop, have rendered the suspect in
custody for Miranda purposes.404 These kinds of police measures are
quintessential features of a custodial arrest. Having a suspect lay prostrate
on the ground while surrounded by police, or placed into a patrol vehicle,
may also satisfy the basic Miranda standard, but determining whether these
instances would make a suspect "feel[] completely at the mercy of the
police," is dependent on the unique facts of a particular case.405 Courts
should examine, among other circumstances, the number of officers
involved, the sort of physical aggression exercised by police, and the extent
to which the suspect is isolated from the public. Depending on the factual
circumstances, these types of detentions can foster more coercive
interrogation settings than traditional Terry stops, where an officer may
require a suspect to simply place his hands over his head or against a wall
during the frisk and interrogation.
As previously noted, the amorphous character of the Terry doctrine
renders almost impossible an effective solution that evades a judge's
discretion altogether. 406 Cases that produce a conflict between Miranda
and Terry are, by their nature, extremely fact sensitive. As a consequence,
courts should avoid a framework whose fixation on technical measurements
or fine details would lead judges into a profound and undesirable morass.
For this conflict, courts should rely on basic standards and principles
provided by Miranda and its progeny.
The duration of an intrusive Terry stop may be a contributing factor in
the court's overall analysis, but it should not play a commanding role in the
ultimate outcome. To be sure, the Supreme Court in Berkemer included a
stop and frisk's duration as one factor among others for courts to consider
402. Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 659 (2004) (citing Keohane, 516 U.S. at
112).
403. California v. Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121, 1125 (1983) (per curiam) (quoting Oregon v.
Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 495 (1977) (per curiam)); see also supra notes 83-87 and
accompanying text.
404. It is difficult to square the Ninth Circuit's view in Cervantes-Flores that handcuffs
during a Terry stop did not trigger Miranda, while the Supreme Court assumed almost
beyond argument in Quarles that handcuffs did constitute custody for Miranda purposes.
The best explanation would be that the Ninth Circuit attempted to compensate for Terry's
particular societal interests and limited duration. See supra notes 104-06, 315-24 and
accompanying text.
405. Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 438 (1984).
406. See supra note 163 and accompanying text.
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in a case-by-case framework. 40 7 But as Berkemer and, more recently,
Keohane stated, courts should perform a reasonable person analysis from
the defendant's position in custody.408 Not surprisingly, more intrusive
detentions during Terry stops may very well lead a suspect to reasonably
believe that his detention will be longer despite not knowing for certain
how long the custody will actually continue. The Second Circuit cited this
very point in Newton when concluding that the officers' aggressive
detention rendered moot the government's argument that the stop ultimately
could not last very long.409
A stop's limited duration may also be the direct result of a highly
coercive interrogation, which, in turn, produces a quick confession or
statement by the suspect. In that case, courts should not judge the coercive
quality of a police detention based on its effectiveness to produce desirable
results. The Supreme Court established Miranda precisely to avoid this
theory of analysis. 4 10
A court may also ask whether the officer's words constituted an
interrogation according to Miranda, though one would expect that most
Terry stops involve direct questions by police for the exact purpose of
eliciting an incriminating response.411 The Innis standard, even narrowly
applied, would likely encompass all questions during a Terry stop. After
all, despite its considerable growth over the past forty years, Terry still only
permits questions that are suitably catered to confirm or dispel an officer's
reasonable suspicion.412 More deliberate or indirect conversation, similar
to that involved in Innis, could not find refuge under Terry's basic
requirements.
Overall, applying the basic Miranda standard to Terry avoids problems
associated with creating an artificial standard to compensate for Terry's
own societal concerns. This is precisely how some courts have managed to
circumvent Miranda's application to facts that assuredly involve custodial
arrest.413 Since degree of restraint is only one part of the inquiry, a court's
desire to provide added compensation for Terry's institutional concerns
need not interfere with Miranda's core concern for inherently coercive
settings, such as those associated with custodial arrest.414 Establishing the
custody element for Miranda would not conclude the analysis of whether
Miranda rights should apply. Further inquiry must proceed.
407. Berkemer, 468 U.S. at 437.
408. Thompson v. Keohane, 516 U.S. 99, 112 (1995); Berkemer, 468 U.S. at 442; supra
note 119.
409. See supra notes 369-73 and accompanying text.
410. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 448, 457-58 (1966) (explaining that hostile
police interrogation tactics can be effective, but that their use violates basic civilized notions
of dignity and liberty).
411. See supra notes 88-96 and accompanying text.
412. See supra note 188 and accompanying text.
413. See supra Part 11.13.
414. See supra Part I.A.2.
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If a court should find that custodial interrogation exists, its second task
should be to analyze the nature of the criminal activity involved during a
Terry detention and determine whether the police actions, once holding the
suspect in custody, were narrowly catered to that legitimate end. Terry
stops have long since evolved from the decision's original framework that
dealt exclusively with averting immediate danger. 415 Today, police may
justify a stop and frisk during a routine narcotics investigation, among other
crimes lacking transparent safety concerns. 416 However, to forgo a
suspect's Miranda rights, the overriding state interest during a Terry stop
should exceed the mere risk of deterring a suspect's cooperation during a
drug investigation. There must be more at stake before courts can sanction
the compromise of a constitutional guarantee.
To suspend Miranda rights during a suspect's detention, the Terry stop
must present a necessity to avert immediate harm to oneself or others. An
unsubstantiated hunch that potential weapons exist during an ad hoc drug
bust would not justify such an intrusion without Miranda warnings.
However, a reasonable suspicion that weapons are present during a drug
transaction might reach the threshold justifiable for the delay of Miranda
warnings, assuming that circumstances indicate potential violence during
the stop and frisk.417 Thus, if a potential immediate danger exists while a
suspect is in custody, an officer should be able compel the suspect to
answer important questions that will help avert that crisis without being
hindered by the deterring effects produced by Miranda warnings.
As the Second Circuit in Newton demonstrated, this rationale is fully
consistent, not only with Terry, but also with Miranda.418 It reconciles
Terry with Miranda's principal exception in Quarles, in which the concern
for public safety warrants a delay in Miranda rights so that a potential crisis
can be averted.419
As a subpart of this second inquiry, a court should investigate whether
the interrogation utilized by police was "consistent with the limited purpose
of the Terry stop"--to prevent immediate harm. 420 The fact that a public
415. See supra notes 175-83 and accompanying text.
416. See supra note 181 and accompanying text.
417. In this regard, the public safety exception is slightly more lenient for police than the
original Terry holding, which spoke of an officer's need to prevent impending harm. Under
Quarles, the harm need not be inevitable. See supra note 111.
418. See supra notes 97-111, 143-45 and accompanying text.
419. In this inquiry, courts should not confuse a public safety concern that provides the
justification for the Terry stop and those immediate dangers still at large once the suspect is
under detention. Only exigent circumstances that exist while the suspect is in custody can be
considered for purposes of Miranda. Thus, it is possible that an officer may initiate a Terry
stop to prevent immediate harm and succeed in fully averting that threat by detaining the
suspect. In this case, the officer could not then successfully argue for the Quarles exception
since his subsequent custodial interrogation of the suspect would have no further immediate
danger to avert. Of course, courts must use their discretion to determine whether the exigent
circumstances have passed.




safety threat exists during the detention does not provide police with a
blank check to perform a thorough investigative inquiry into the suspect's
past. Rather, it restricts police conduct only to those questions narrowly
tailored to avert that immediate harm.421 For example, as Chief Judge
James Loken of the Eighth Circuit discussed in his dissent in Martinez, had
the police officer asked the suspect in Martinez "about his actions earlier
that day, or the details of the robbery, or other crimes under investigation,
that would be custodial interrogation" outside the narrow scope of the
stop's purpose and beyond the grasp of the Quarles exception.422 Police
questions need not always touch exactly on the item or person at large, but
they must address essential facts or clues that will ultimately lead police to
their destination. 423 Thus, once accepting that the public safety exception
applies during the Terry stop, a court must consider whether the
interrogation was meant to avert that immediate harm or whether the
questions indicate a broader investigation into the defendant's involvement,
devoid of the urgency required to overcome Miranda.424
Under this framework, the Terry doctrine comes full circle. The Warren
Court originally envisioned Terry stops as appropriate only during
situations in which reasonable suspicion of immediate danger was
evident.425 However, the Supreme Court has long since abandoned this
restriction and expanded those justifications to more routine investigations
of potential criminal activity.426 Reliance on Quarles returns Terry back to
its original scope when dealing with Miranda. This inquiry does not,
however, scale back the current form of Terry stops altogether. Officers
may still utilize handcuffs or draw weapons during a stop in which they
possess only a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. They may
likewise obtain physical evidence from that legitimate stop without running
afoul of the Fourth Amendment. In other words, this Note's approach
allows Terry to exist in its modern, expansive form, while imposing certain
Fifth Amendment restrictions on police only when their conduct
simultaneously subjects a suspect to custodial interrogation.
It is likewise worth reiterating that the conflict between Miranda and
Terry only implicates statements made by the defendant. It would not
exclude evidence retrieved by an officer during the valid Terry stop (which
would precede the Miranda warnings) or physical evidence produced by a
Miranda violation. 427 Applying a rule that enforces Miranda rights during
a stop and frisk will thus not dramatically undermine police access to vital
421. For an illustration of this test, see United States v. Kim, 292 F.3d 969, 976-77 (9th
Cir. 2002).
422. Martinez, 462 F.3d at 913 (Loken, C.J., dissenting).
423. See supra notes 379-81 and accompanying text.
424. This approach follows the rationale of the Supreme Court in Quarles. See supra note
108 and accompanying text.
425. See supra notes 143-45 and accompanying text.
426. See supra notes 173-83 and accompanying text.




evidence. Fear that Miranda will exclude crucial evidence during Terry
stops neglects the abundance of tools still at the officer's disposal during a
stop and frisk to investigate criminal activity. But if courts, on the one
hand, allow broad police measures under the aegis of Terry, they must also
acknowledge the intrusions they impose on a person's liberty and
subsequently enforce the constitutionally required protections afforded to
suspects during custodial interrogation. 428
C. Applying the Two-Part Test to Previous Appellate Cases
Application of this Note's two-part inquiry to those appellate cases
discussed earlier would reverse decisions made according to either existing
approach. In Leshuk, the police subjected the defendant to custodial
interrogation worthy of Miranda by surrounding him, holding him down
during questioning, and threatening violence if the suspect did not
comply. 429 This is a rather close case, however, as no handcuffs or drawn
weapons were involved during the interrogation. Next, the Terry detention
involved only drug-related hunches with little evidence that the suspect
constituted a legitimate public safety threat. 430 Accordingly, the police stop
did not entail adequate justification to curb the defendant's Miranda rights
and thus his statements should have been excluded.
Similarly, the First Circuit's decision in Trueber would be reversed under
this Note's approach. The presence of custodial interrogation in Trueber
can hardly be disputed based on the multiple officers' surrounding the
defendant with, at one point, their guns drawn.431 Moreover, the opinion
only noted the officers' suspicions of drug-trafficking and money
laundering when they stopped the defendant. 432 This type of activity should
not alone justify the delay of Miranda rights.
Likewise, the Ninth Circuit's decision .in Cervantes-Flores would also be
reversed. The suspect was handcuffed by law enforcement after crossing
the national border based on suspicion of drug trafficking.433 Though his
detention was a legitimate exercise of Terry authority, the suspect's
accompanying statements should have been excluded since law
enforcement did not have a pressing public safety threat that would justify a
waiver of Miranda.
Meanwhile, the Eighth Circuit's decision to exclude evidence in
Martinez would also be reversed based on the police officers' need,
following a bank robbery, to collect vital information through questioning
428. See United States v. Perdue, 8 F.3d 1455, 1465 (10th Cir. 1993) ("Police officers
must make a choice-if they are going to take highly intrusive steps to protect themselves
from danger, they must similarly provide protection to their suspects by advising them of
their constitutional rights.").
429. See United States v. Leshuk, 65 F.3d 1105, 1110 (4th Cir. 1995); supra notes 278-
81 and accompanying text.
430. See supra notes 278-81 and accompanying text.
431. See supra notes 296-306 and accompanying text.
432. See supra notes 296-306 and accompanying text.
433. See supra notes 315-24 and accompanying text.
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to preserve the peace. 434 The officers' conduct, rightfully considered a
custodial interrogation, presented a case where an ad hoc investigation
targeted vital information needed to avert a legitimate and immediate
harm.435 Once the officers learned of the bank robbery, they possessed
specific knowledge that an armed man, able and willing to commit violent
crimes, was still at large in the vicinity. Furthermore, the police held a
reasonable suspicion that the robbery involved co-conspirators, which
would make the interrogation even more important to the officers'
peacekeeping role. Accordingly, since the questioning was limited to the
exigency, the Eighth Circuit should have admitted the defendant's
statements.
The Tenth Circuit's exclusion of the defendant's statements in Perdue
presents a more difficult case. 436 While the defendant was subject to
custodial interrogation, the officer's suspicions involved a drug operation
run by the defendant in a building that stored weapons, including a nine-
millimeter pistol and a twelve-gauge shotgun.437 Based on the officers'
reasonable belief that the premise was still dangerous, they were justified to
interrogate the defendant to the extent that it would collect information
necessary to preserve the peace.
According to this Note's proposed inquiry, the crucial issue in Perdue is
whether the police interrogation was tailored to the objective of preventing
immediate harm. The officer's questioning only addressed the defendant's
involvement with drugs, not potential weapons. 438 However, it is quite
plausible that this questioning was essential before a further inquiry into the
potential harms still at large. Moreover, the officer's questioning can be
justified based on his need to confirm that it was indeed the defendant's
operation that the police were investigating. That fact was only confirmed
after the police questioned the defendant. 439 Based on these facts, the
police questioning was sufficiently tailored to the purpose of preserving
public safety. Accordingly, the Tenth Circuit's decision in Perdue would
also have been reversed.
Finally, as previously discussed, the appellate court decision that most
aligns with this Note's proposed test, and best preserves the interests
associated with Miranda and Terry, is the Second Circuit's decision in
Newton.440 In Newton, the court acknowledged that the defendant was
subject to custodial interrogation during a Terry stop and would have
required Miranda warnings but for the police officers' compelling interest
to investigate their suspicion and preserve the public peace.
441
434. See supra notes 352-60 and accompanying text.
435. See supra notes 352-60 and accompanying text.
436. See supra notes 329-33 and accompanying text.
437. United States v. Perdue, 8 F.3d 1455, 1458-59 (10th Cir. 1993).
438. Id.
439. Id.
440. See supra notes 368-78 and accompanying text.
441. See supra notes 368-78 and accompanying text.
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Accordingly, the Second Circuit calibrated the proper balance of the
interests associated with each doctrine to produce the appropriate outcome.
CONCLUSION
In response to the events that shocked the nation and world on September
11, 2001, the public has instilled great trust in local law enforcement to
protect it against terrorist threats of all forms. Along with the benefits
associated with greater police protection inevitably arises the possibility
that some liberties will be sacrificed.
The current dispute between Miranda and Terry existed long before
modem terrorism gripped the national conscience. Each doctrine originated
as an attempt by the Warren Court to balance two societal concerns, public
safety and civil liberties, fundamental within a democratic society. Their
creators did not foresee a potential collision. However, both Miranda's and
Terry's subsequent developments produced a "subtle interplay" between the
two, which courts today have not yet completely unearthed.442 Thus, it is
inevitable that a judicial solution to this matter, likely at the nation's highest
court, will be decided with a post-9/11 outlook.
In the midst of another international crisis, plagued by concern for
national security and the subsequent impact of fervent patriotism on
individual freedoms, Justice Robert Jackson wrote the following:
Without promise of a limiting Bill of Rights it is doubtful if our
Constitution could have mustered enough strength to enable its
ratification. To enforce those rights today is not to choose weak
government over strong government. It is only to adhere as a means of
strength to individual freedom of mind in preference to officially
disciplined uniformity for which history indicates a disappointing and
disastrous end.443
The continuing threat of terrorism should undoubtedly place great
importance on the need for America to protect its own citizenry. And in
that same light, it should demonstrate that the value of national "strength" is
immeasurable. 444
It is in this context that the conflict between Miranda and Terry now
endures. With new institutional factors now at play, our nation's criminal
procedure law stands on the brink of a new era. Courts are now trusted
with the immense responsibility of elucidating these new barriers. In the
end, only a balanced solution, preserving a defendant's Miranda rights
during Terry encounters while stringently enforcing the public safety
exception can best serve the Constitution and this nation's interests.
442. See Perdue, 8 F.3d at 1461.
443. W. Va. State Bd. ofEduc. v. Bamette, 319 U.S. 624, 636-37 (1943).
444. See id. at 637.
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